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Abstract
We use data on insurance deductible choices to estimate a structural model of
risky choice that incorporates "standard" risk aversion (diminishing marginal util-
ity for wealth) and probability distortions. We find that probability distortions–
characterized by substantial overweighting of small probabilities and only mild insensi-
tivity to probability changes–play an important role in explaining the aversion to risk
manifested in deductible choices. This finding is robust to allowing for observed and
unobserved heterogeneity in preferences. We demonstrate that neither Ko˝szegi-Rabin
loss aversion alone nor Gul disappointment aversion alone can explain our estimated
probability distortions, signifying a key role for probability weighting.
(JEL D01, D03, D12, D81, G22)
∗For helpful comments, we thank seminar and conference participants at Berkeley, Collegio Carlo Alberto,
Georgetown University, Harvard University, Heidelberg University, Michigan State University, Princeton Uni-
versity, University of Arizona, UCLA, University of Pennsylvania, Univesity of Western Ontario, the 2010
Behavioral Economics Annual Meeting, the Workshops on Behavioral and Institutional Research and Finan-
cial Regulation, FUR XIV, the 85th Annual Conference of the Western Economic Association International,
the 2011 American Economic Association Annual Meeting, the 21st Annual Meeting of the American Law
and Economics Association, CORIPE, and the 2011 CESifo Area Conference on Behavioural Economics.
We also thank Darcy Steeg Morris for excellent research assistance. We acknowledge financial support from
National Science Foundation grant SES-1031136. In addition, Barseghyan acknowledges financial support
from the Institute for Social Sciences at Cornell University, O’Donoghue acknowledges financial support from
CESifo, and Molinari acknowledges financial support from NSF grants SES-0617482 and SES-0922330.
†Department of Economics, Cornell University, 456 Uris Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853 (lb247@cornell.edu).
1 Introduction
Households are averse to risk–they require a premium to invest in equity and they purchase
insurance at actuarially unfair rates. The standard expected utility model attributes risk
aversion to a concave utility function defined over final wealth states (diminishing marginal
utility for wealth). Indeed, many empirical studies of risk preferences assume expected utility
and estimate such "standard" risk aversion (e.g., Cohen and Einav 2007).
A considerable body of research, however, suggests that in addition to (or perhaps instead
of) standard risk aversion, households’ aversion to risk may be attributable to other, "non-
standard" features of risk preferences. A large strand of the literature focuses on probability
weighting and loss aversion, two features that originate with prospect theory (Kahneman and
Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992). Alternatively, Gul (1991) and others propose
models that feature various forms of disappointment aversion. More recently, Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2006, 2007) develop a model of reference-dependent preferences that features a form
of "rational expectations" loss aversion (which we label KR loss aversion).
In this paper, we use data on households’ deductible choices in auto and home insurance
to estimate a structural model of risky choice that incorporates standard risk aversion and
these non-standard features, and we investigate which combinations of features best explain
our data. We show that, in our domain, probability weighting, KR loss aversion, and Gul
disappointment aversion all imply an effective distortion of probabilities relative to the ex-
pected utility model. Hence, we focus on estimating a model that features standard risk
aversion and "generic" probability distortions. We then investigate what we can learn from
our estimates about the possible sources of probability distortions. We find that probability
distortions–in the form of substantial overweighting of claim probabilities–play a key role
in explaining households’ deductible choices. We then demonstrate that neither KR loss
aversion alone nor Gul disappointment aversion alone can explain our estimated probability
distortions, signifying a crucial role for probability weighting.
In Section 2, we provide an overview of our data. The source of the data is a large U.S.
property and casualty insurance company that offers multiple lines of insurance, including
auto and home coverage. The full dataset comprises yearly information on more than 400,000
households who held auto or home policies between 1998 and 2006. For reasons we explain,
we restrict attention in our main analysis to a core sample of 4170 households who hold
both auto and home policies and who first purchased their auto and home policies from
the company in the same year, in either 2005 or 2006. For each household, we observe the
household’s deductible choices in three lines of coverage–auto collision, auto comprehensive,
and home all perils. We also observe the coverage-specific menus of premium-deductible
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combinations from which each household’s choices were made. In addition, we observe each
household’s claims history for each coverage, as well as a rich set of demographic information.
We utilize the data on claim realizations and demographics to assign each household a
predicted claim probability for each coverage.
In Section 3, we develop our theoretical framework. We begin with an expected utility
model of deductible choice, which incorporates standard risk aversion. We then general-
ize the model to allow for probability distortions–specifically, we permit a household with
claim probability µ to act as if its claim probability were Ω(µ). In our baseline analysis, we
take a semi-nonparametric approach, and do not impose a parametric form on the proba-
bility distortion function Ω(µ). For the utility for wealth function, we use a second-order
Taylor expansion, which allows us to measure standard risk aversion by the coefficient of ab-
solute risk aversion r. Finally, to account for observationally equivalent households choosing
different deductibles, and for individual households making "inconsistent" choices across cov-
erages (Barseghyan et al. 2011; Einav et al. 2012), we assume random utility with additively
separable choice noise (McFadden 1974, 1981).
In Section 3.3, we demonstrate that a key feature of our data–namely, that the choice
set for each coverage includes more than two deductible options–enables us to separately
identify standard risk aversion r and the probability distortion Ω(µ). To illustrate the
basic intuition, consider a household with claim probability µ, and suppose we observe the
household’s maximum willingness to pay (WTP ) to reduce its deductible from $1000 to
$500. If that were all we observed, we could not separately identify r and Ω(µ), because
multiple combinations can explain this WTP . However, because standard risk aversion and
probability distortions generate aversion to risk in different ways, each of these combinations
implies a different WTP to further reduce the deductible from $500 to $250. Therefore, if
we also observe this WTP , we can pin down r and Ω(µ).
In Section 4, we report the results of our baseline analysis in which we assume homogenous
preferences–i.e., we assume that each household has the same standard risk aversion r
and the same probability distortion function Ω(µ). We take three approaches based on
the method of sieves (Chen 2007) to estimating Ω(µ), each of which yields the same main
message: large probability distortions, characterized by substantial overweighting of claim
probabilities and only mild insensitivity to probability changes, in the range of our data.
Under our primary approach, for example, our estimates imply Ω(0.02) = 0.08, Ω(0.05) =
0.11, and Ω(0.10) = 0.16. In Section 4.2, we demonstrate the statistical and economic
significance of our estimated Ω(µ).
In Section 4.3, we discuss what we learn from our baseline estimates about the possi-
ble sources of probability distortions. We briefly describe models of probability weighting,
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KR loss aversion, and Gul disappointment aversion, and derive the probability distortion
function implied by each model.1 We demonstrate that models of KR loss aversion and of
Gul disappointment aversion imply probability distortions that are inconsistent with our
estimated Ω(µ). We therefore conclude that we can "reject" the hypothesis that KR loss
aversion alone or Gul disappointment aversion alone is the source of our estimated proba-
bility distortions, and that instead our results point to probability weighting. In addition,
we highlight that our estimated Ω(µ) bears a close resemblance to the probability weighting
function originally posited by Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
In Section 5, we expand the model to permit heterogeneous preferences–i.e., we allow
each household to have a different combination of standard risk aversion and probability
distortions. We take three approaches, permitting first only observed heterogeneity, then
only unobserved heterogeneity, and then both observed and unobserved heterogeneity.2 We
find that our main message is robust to allowing for heterogeneity in preferences. While our
estimates indicate substantial heterogeneity, under each approach the average probability
distortion function is remarkably similar to our baseline estimated Ω(µ).
In Section 6, we investigate the sensitivity of our estimates to other modeling assump-
tions. Most notably, we extend the model to account for unobserved heterogeneity in claim
probabilities, we consider the case of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility, and we
address the issue of moral hazard. All in all, we find that our main message is quite robust.
We conclude in Section 7 by discussing certain implications and limitations of our study.
Among other things, we discuss the relevance of the fact that, in our data, probability
weighting is indistinguishable from systematic risk misperceptions. Hence, the probability
distortions we estimate may reflect either probability weighting or risk misperceptions.
Numerous previous studies estimate risk preferences from observed choices, relying in
most cases on survey and experimental data and in some cases on economic field data. Most
studies that rely on field data–including two that use data on insurance deductible choices
(Cohen and Einav 2007; Sydnor 2010)–estimate expected utility models, which permit only
standard risk aversion. Only a handful of studies use field data to estimate models that fea-
ture probability weighting. Cicchetti and Dubin (1994), who use data on telephone wire in-
surance choices to estimate a rank-dependent expected utility model, and Jullien and Salanié
(2000), who use data on bets on U.K. horse races to estimate a rank-dependent expected util-
ity model and a prospect theory model, find little evidence of probability weighting. Kliger
and Levy (2009) use data on call options on the S&P 500 index to estimate a prospect the-
1Detailed descriptions of these models appear in the Appendix.
2A number of recent papers have studied the role of unobserved heterogeneity in risk preferences (e.g.,
Cohen and Einav 2007; Chiappori et al. 2009; Andrikogiannopoulou 2010).
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ory model, and find that probability weighting is manifested by their data. Snowberg and
Wolfers (2010) use data on bets on U.S. horse races to test the fit of two models–a model
with standard risk aversion alone and a model with probability weighting alone–and find
that the latter model better fits their data. Andrikogiannopoulou (2010) uses data on bets
in an online sportsbook to estimate a prospect theory model, and finds that the average
bettor exhibits moderate probability weighting. Lastly, Chiappori et al. (2012) and Gandhi
and Serrano-Padial (2012) use data on bets on U.S. horse races to estimate the distribution
of risk preferences among bettors, and find evidence consistent with probability weighting.3
Each of the foregoing studies, however, either (i) uses market-level data, which necessi-
tates taking a representative agent approach (Jullien and Salanié 2000; Kliger and Levy 2009;
Snowberg and Wolfers 2010) or assuming that different populations of agents have the same
distribution of risk preferences (Chiappori et al. 2012; Gandhi and Serrano-Padial 2012),
(ii) estimates a model that does not simultaneously feature standard risk aversion and prob-
ability weighting (Kliger and Levy 2009; Snowberg and Wolfers 2010; Andrikogiannopoulou
2010),4 or (iii) takes a parametric approach to probability weighting, specifying one of the
common functions from the literature (Cicchetti and Dubin 1994; Jullien and Salanié 2000;
Kliger and Levy 2009; Andrikogiannopoulou 2010). An important contribution of our study
is that we use household-level field data on insurance choices to jointly estimate standard
risk aversion and non-standard probability distortions without imposing a parametric form
on the latter.5 Our approach in this regard yields two important results. First, by imposing
no parametric form on Ω(µ), we estimate a function that is inconsistent with the probability
weighting functions that are commonly used in the literature (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman
1992; Lattimore et al. 1992; Prelec 1998). Second, by jointly estimating r and Ω(µ), we can
empirically assess their relative impact on choices, and we find that probability distortions
generally have a larger economic impact than standard risk aversion.
3Bruhin et al. (2010) is another recent study that echoes our conlcusion that probability weighting is
important. They use experimental data on subjects’ choices over binary money lotteries to estimate a
mixture model of cumulative prospect theory. They find that approximately 20 percent of subjects can
essentially be characterized as expected value maximizers, while approximately 80 percent exhibit significant
probability weighting.
4As noted above, Snowberg and Wolfers (2010) estimate two separate models–one with standard risk
aversion alone and one with probability weighting alone. Kliger and Levy (2009) and Andrikogiannopoulou
(2010) estimate cumulative prospect theory models, which feature a value function defined over gains and
losses in lieu of the standard utility function defined over final wealth states. Both studies, incidentally, find
evidence of "status quo" loss aversion.
5This is the case for our baseline analysis in Section 4. In our analysis in Sections 5 and 6, we take a
parametric approach that is guided by the results of our baseline analysis.
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2 Data Description
2.1 Overview and Core Sample
We acquired the data from a large U.S. property and casualty insurance company. The
company offers multiple lines of insurance, including auto, home, and umbrella policies. The
full dataset comprises yearly information on more than 400,000 households who held auto
or home policies between 1998 and 2006.6 For each household, the data contain all the
information in the company’s records regarding the households and their policies (except for
identifying information). The data also record the number of claims that each household
filed with the company under each of its policies during the period of observation.
We restrict attention to households’ deductible choices in three lines of coverage: (i) auto
collision coverage; (ii) auto comprehensive coverage; and (iii) home all perils coverage.7 In
addition, we consider only the initial deductible choices of each household. This is meant
to increase confidence that we are working with active choices; one might be concerned that
some households renew their policies without actively reassessing their deductible choices.
Finally, we restrict attention to households who hold both auto and home policies and who
first purchased their auto and home policies from the company in the same year, in either
2005 or 2006. The latter restriction is meant to avoid temporal issues, such as changes in
household characteristics and in the economic environment. In the end, we are left with
a core sample of 4170 households. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for a subset of
variables, specifically those we use later to estimate the households’ utility parameters.
TABLE 1
2.2 Deductibles and Premiums
For each household in the core sample, we observe the household’s deductible choices for auto
collision, auto comprehensive, and home, as well as the premiums paid by the household for
each type of coverage. In addition, the data contain the exact menus of premium-deductible
combinations that were available to each household at the time it made its deductible choices.
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the deductible choices and the premium menus, respectively, of
6The dataset used in this paper is not the same dataset used in Barseghyan et al. (2011). This dataset
includes households that purchase insurance from a single insurance company (through multiple insurance
agents), whereas that dataset includes households that purchase insurance through a single insurance agent
(from multiple insurance companies).
7A brief description of each type of coverage appears in the Appendix. For simplicity, we often refer to
home all perils merely as home.
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the households in the core sample.8
TABLES 2 & 3
Because it is important to understand the sources of variation in premiums, we briefly
describe the plan the company uses to rate a policy in each line of coverage. We emphasize
that the company’s rating plan is subject to state regulation and oversight. In particular,
the regulations require that the company receive prior approval of its rating plan by the
state insurance commissioner, and they prohibit the company and its agents from charging
rates that depart from the plan. Under the plan, the company determines a base price p¯
for each household according to a coverage-specific rating function, which takes into account
the household’s coverage-relevant characteristics and any applicable discounts. Using the
base price, the company then generates a household-specific menu {(pd, d) : d ∈ D}, which
associates a premium pd with each deductible d in the coverage-specific set of deductible
options D, according to a coverage-specific multiplication rule, pd = (g(d) · p¯) + c, where
g (·) > 0 and c > 0. The multiplicative factors {g(d) : d ∈ D} are known in the industry as
the deductible factors and c is a small markup known as the expense fee. The deductible
factors and the expense fee are coverage specific but household invariant.
2.3 Claim Probabilities
For purposes of our analysis, we need to estimate for each household the likelihood of ex-
periencing a claim for each coverage. We begin by estimating how claim rates depend on
observables. In an effort to obtain the most precise estimates, we use the full dataset:
1,348,020 household-year records for auto and 1,265,229 household-year records for home.
For each household-year record, the data record the number of claims filed by the household
in that year. We assume that household i’s claims under coverage j in year t follow a Pois-
son distribution with arrival rate λijt. In addition, we assume that deductible choices do not
influence claim rates, i.e., households do not suffer from moral hazard.9 We treat the claim
rates as latent random variables and assume that
lnλijt = X
′
ijtβj + ij,
8Tables A.1 through A.3 in the Appendix summarize the premium menus conditional on households’
actual deductible choices.
9We revisit this assumption in Section 6.4.
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where Xijt is a vector of observables,
10 ij is an unobserved iid error term, and exp(ij)
follows a gamma distribution with unit mean and variance φj. We perform standard Poisson
panel regressions with random effects to obtain maximum likelihood estimates of βj and φj
for each coverage j. By allowing for unobserved heterogeneity, the Poisson random effects
model accounts for overdispersion, including due to excess zeros, in a similar way as the
(pooled) negative binomial model (see, e.g., Wooldridge 2002, ch. 19).11 The results of the
claim rate regressions are reported in Tables A.4 and A.5 in the Appendix.
Next, we use the results of the claim rate regressions to generate predicted claim prob-
abilities. Specifically, for each household i, we use the regression estimates to generate a
predicted claim rate λ̂ij for each coverage j, conditional on the household’s ex ante char-
acteristics Xij and ex post claims experience.
12 In principle, during the policy period, a
household may experience zero claims, one claim, two claims, and so forth. In the model, we
assume that households disregard the possibility of more than one claim (see Section 3.1).13
Given this assumption, we transform λ̂ij into a predicted claim probability µ̂ij using
14
µ̂ij = 1− exp(−λ̂ij).
Table 4 summarizes the predicted claim probabilities for the core sample. Figure 1 plots
the empirical density functions. The mean predicted claim probabilities for auto collision,
auto comprehensive, and home are 0.069, 0.021, and 0.084, respectively. Auto comprehensive
accounts for most of the low claim probabilities, while auto collision and home account for the
bulk of the medium and high claim probabilities. Table 4 also reports pairwise correlations
among the predicted claim probabilities and between the predicted claim probabilities and
the premiums for coverage with a $500 deductible. Each of the pairwise correlations is
positive, though none are large. These small correlations are not surprising. Even for a
fixed claim probability, there are a variety of reasons why the company would want to
charge different premiums to different households–e.g., differences in the insured value of the
10In addition to the variables in Table 1 (which we use later to estimate the households’ utility parameters),
Xijt includes numerous other variables (see Tables A.4 and A.5 in the Appendix).
11An alternative approach would be a zero-inflated model. However, Vuong (1989) and likelihood ratio
tests select the negative binomial model over the zero-inflated model, suggesting that adjustment for excess
zeros is not necessary once we allow for unobserved heterogeneity.
12More specifically, λ̂ij = exp(X
′
ij β̂j)E(exp(ij)|Yij), where Yij records household i’s claims experience
under coverage j after purchasing the policy and E(exp(ij)|Yij) is calculated assuming exp(ij) follows a
gamma distribution with unit mean and variance φ̂j .
13Because claim rates are small (85 percent of the predicted claim rates in the core sample are less than
0.1, and 99 percent are less than 0.2), the likelihood of two or more claims is very small.
14The Poisson probability mass function is f(x, λ) = exp(−λ)λx/x! for x = 0, 1, 2, ... and λ ≥ 0. Thus, if
the number of claims x follows a Poisson distribution with arrival rate λ, then the probability of experiencing
at least one claim is 1− exp(−λ).
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auto or home, differences in the relevant repair and rebuilding costs, and volume discounts.
Moreover, our predicted claim probabilities take into account ex post claims experience (i.e.,
claims that occur after the household purchases the policy), and this information is not
available to the company when it rates the policy.
TABLE 4 & FIGURE 1
3 Model, Estimation, and Identification
3.1 Model
We assume that a household treats its three deductible choices as independent decisions. This
assumption is motivated in part by computational considerations,15 but also by the literature
on "narrow bracketing" (e.g., Read et al. 1999), which suggests that when people make
multiple choices, they frequently do not assess the consequences in an integrated way, but
rather tend to make each choice in isolation. Thus, we develop a model for how a household
chooses the deductible for a single type of insurance coverage. To simplify notation, we
suppress the subscripts for household and coverage (although we remind the reader that
premiums and claim probabilities are household and coverage specific).
The household faces a menu of premium-deductible pairs {(pd, d) : d ∈ D}, where pd
is the premium associated with deductible d, and D is the set of deductible options. We
assume that the household disregards the possibility of experiencing more than one claim
during the policy period, and that the probability of experiencing one claim is µ. In addition,
we assume that the household believes that its choice of deductible does not influence its
claim probability, and that every claim exceeds the highest available deductible.16 Under the
foregoing assumptions, the choice of deductible involves a choice among deductible lotteries
of the form
Ld ≡ (−pd, 1− µ;−pd − d, µ) .
Under expected utility theory, a household’s preferences over deductible lotteries are
influenced only by standard risk aversion. Given initial wealth w, the expected utility of
15If instead we were to assume that a household treats its deductible choices as a joint decision, then the
household would face 120 options and the utility function would have several hundred terms.
16We make the latter assumption more plausible by excluding the $2500 and $5000 deductible options
from the home menu. Only 1.6 percent of households in the core sample chose a home deductible of $2500
or $5000. We assign these households a home deductible of $1000. In this respect, we follow Cohen and
Einav (2007), who also exclude the two highest deductible options (chosen by 1 percent of the policyholders
in their sample) and assign the third highest deductible to policyholders who chose the two highest options.
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deductible lottery Ld is given by
EU(Ld) = (1− µ) u (w − pd) + µu (w − pd − d) ,
where u(w) represents standard utility defined over final wealth states. Standard risk aversion
is captured by the concavity of u(w).
Over the years, economists and other social scientists have proposed alternative models
that feature additional sources of aversion to risk. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) offer prospect theory, which features probability weighting
and loss aversion. Gul (1991) proposes a model of disappointment aversion. More recently,
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) develop a model of reference-dependent utility that features
loss aversion with an endogenous reference point, which we label KR loss aversion. In
the Appendix, we show that, in our setting, probability weighting, KR loss aversion, and
Gul disappointment aversion all imply an effective distortion of probabilities relative to the
expected utility model.17 Specifically, each implies that there exists a probability distortion
function Ω (µ) such that the utility of deductible lottery Ld may be written as
U(Ld) = (1− Ω (µ))u (w − pd) + Ω (µ) u (w − pd − d) . (1)
In the estimation, we do not take a stand on the underlying source of probability distortions.
Their separate identification would require parametric assumptions which we are unwilling
to make. Rather, we focus on estimating "generic" probability distortions–i.e., we estimate
the function Ω (µ). We then discuss what we learn from our estimated Ω (µ) about the
possible sources of probability distortions (see Section 4.3).
In our analysis, we estimate both the utility function u(w) and the probability distortion
function Ω (µ). For u(w), we generally follow Cohen and Einav (2007) and Barseghyan et al.
(2011) and consider a second-order Taylor expansion. Also, because u(w) is unique only up
to an affine transformation, we normalize the scale of utility by dividing u′(w). This yields
u(w +∆)
u′(w)
−
u(w)
u′(w)
= ∆−
r
2
∆2,
where r ≡ −u′′(w)/u′(w) is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Because the term
u(w)/u′(w) enters as an additive constant, it does not affect utility comparisons; hence, we
17We do not consider the original, "status quo" loss aversion proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
because it cannot explain aversion to risk in the context of insurance deductible choices, where all outcomes
are losses relative to initial wealth. Instead, we consider KR loss aversion, which can explain aversion to risk
in this context, because gains and losses are defined relative to expectations about outcomes. For details,
see Section 4.3 and the Appendix.
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drop it. With this specification, equation (1) becomes
U(Ld) = − [pd + Ω(µ)d]−
r
2
[
(1− Ω(µ)) (pd)
2 + Ω(µ) (pd + d)
2
]
. (2)
The first term reflects the expected value of deductible lottery Ld with respect to the distorted
claim probability Ω(µ). The second term reflects disutility from bearing risk–it is the
expected value of the squared losses, scaled by standard risk aversion r.18
Our goal is to estimate both standard risk aversion r and and the probability distortion
Ω (µ). In our baseline analysis in Section 4, we take a semi-nonparametric approach and
estimate Ω (µ) via sieve methods (Chen 2007). In Sections 5 and 6, we take a parametric
approach that is guided by the results of our baseline analysis.
3.2 Estimation
In the estimation, we must account for observationally equivalent households choosing differ-
ent deductibles, and for individual households making "inconsistent" choices across coverages
(Barseghyan et al. 2011; Einav et al. 2012). We follow McFadden (1974, 1981) and assume
random utility with additively separable choice noise. Specifically, we assume that the utility
from deductible d ∈ D is given by
U(d) ≡ U(Ld) + εd, (3)
where εd is an iid random variable that represents error in evaluating utility. We assume that
εd follows a type 1 extreme value distribution with scale parameter σ.
19 A household chooses
deductible d when U(d) > U(d′) for all d′ 6= d, and thus the probability that a household
chooses deductible d is
Pr (d) ≡ Pr (εd′ − εd < U(Ld)− U(Ld′) ∀ d
′ 6= d) =
exp (U(Ld)/σ)∑
d′∈D exp (U(Ld′)/σ)
.
We use these choice probabilities to construct the likelihood function in the estimation.
In our main analysis, we estimate equation (3) assuming that utility is specified by
equation (2) and that µij = µ̂ij (i.e., household i’s predicted claim probability µ̂ij corresponds
to it subjective claim probability µij). We use combined data for all three coverages. Each
18Note that this specification differs slightly from Cohen and Einav (2007) and Barseghyan et al. (2011),
who use U(Ld) = − [pd + λd]−
r
2
[
λd2
]
(where λ is the Poisson arrival rate). The difference derives from the
fact that those papers additionally take the limit as the policy period becomes arbitrarily small.
19The scale parameter σ is a monotone transformation of the variance of εd, and thus a larger σ means
larger variance. Our estimation procedure permits σ to vary across coverages.
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observation comprises, for a household i and a coverage j, a deductible choice d∗ij, a vector
of household characteristics Zi, a predicted claim probability µ̂ij, and a menu of premium-
deductible combinations {(pdij , dij) : dij ∈ Dj}. To be estimated are:
ri — coefficient of absolute risk aversion (ri = 0 means no standard risk aversion);
Ωi(µ) — probability distortion function (Ωi(µ) = µ means no probability distortions); and
σj — scale of choice noise for coverage j (σj = 0 means no choice noise).
Note that because the scale of utility is pinned down in equation (2), we can identify σL,
σM , and σH separately for auto collision, auto comprehensive, and home, respectively.
3.3 Identification
3.3.1 Identifying r and Ω(µ)
The random utility model in equation (3) comprises the sum of a utility function U(Ld)
and an error term εd. Using the results of Matzkin (1991), normalizations that fix scale
and location, plus regularity conditions that are satisfied in our model, allow us to identify
nonparametrically the utility function U(Ld) within the class of monotone and concave utility
functions. As we explain below, identification of U(Ld) allows us to identify r and Ω(µ).
Take any three deductible options a, b, c ∈ D, with a > b > c, and consider a household
with premium pa for deductible a and claim probability µ. The household’s r and Ω(µ)
determine the premium p˜b that makes the household indifferent between deductibles a and
b, as well as the premium p˜c that makes the household indifferent between deductibles a and
c. Notice that p˜b−pa reflects the household’s maximum willingness to pay (WTP ) to reduce
its deductible from a to b, and p˜c − p˜b reflects the household’s additional WTP to reduce
its deductible from b to c. In the Appendix, we prove the following properties of p˜b and p˜c
when U(Ld) is specified by equation (2).
Property 1. Both p˜b and p˜c are strictly increasing in r and Ω(µ).
Property 2. For any fixed Ω(µ), r = 0 implies p˜b−pa
p˜c−p˜b
= a−b
b−c
, and the ratio p˜b−pa
p˜c−p˜b
is strictly
increasing in r.
Property 3. If p˜b − pa is the same for (r,Ω(µ)) and (r
′,Ω(µ)′) with r < r′ (and thus
Ω(µ) > Ω(µ)′), then p˜c − p˜b is greater for (r,Ω(µ)) than for (r
′,Ω(µ)′).
Property 1 is straightforward: A household’sWTP to reduce its deductible (and thereby
reduce its exposure to risk) will be greater if either its standard risk aversion is larger or its
(distorted) claim probability is larger.
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Property 2 is an implication of standard risk aversion. For any fixed Ω(µ), a risk neutral
household is willing to pay, for instance, exactly twice as much to reduce its deductible from
$1000 to $500 as it is willing to pay to reduce its deductible from $500 to $250. In contrast,
a risk averse household is willing to pay more than twice as much, and the larger is the
household’s standard risk aversion the greater is this ratio.
Property 3 is the key property for identification. To illustrate the underlying intuition,
consider a household with claim probability µ = 0.05 who faces a premium pa = $200 for
deductible a = $1000. Suppose that p˜b − pa = $50–i.e., the household’s WTP to reduce
its deductible from a = $1000 to b = $500 is fifty dollars. Property 1 implies that multiple
combinations of r and Ω(0.05) are consistent with this WTP , and that in each combination
a larger r implies a smaller Ω(0.05). For example, both (i) r = 0 and Ω(0.05) = 0.10 and (ii)
r′ = 0.00222 and Ω(0.05)′ = 0.05 are consistent with p˜b − pa = $50. Property 3, however,
states that these different combinations of r and Ω(0.05) have different implications for the
household’s WTP to reduce its deductible from b = $500 to c = $250. For instance, r = 0
and Ω(0.05) = 0.10 would imply p˜c − p˜b = $25, whereas r
′ = 0.00222 and Ω(0.05)′ = 0.05
would imply p˜c − p˜b = $18.61. More generally–given the household’s WTP to reduce its
deductible from $1000 to $500–the smaller is the household’s WTP to reduce it deductible
from $500 to $250, the larger must be its r and the smaller must be its Ω(0.05).20
Property 3 reveals that our identification strategy relies on a key feature of our data–
namely, that there are more than two deductible options. Given this feature, we can sepa-
rately identify r and Ω(µ) by observing how deductible choices react to exogenous changes in
premiums for a fixed claim probability.21 We then can identify the shape of Ω(µ) by observ-
ing how deductible choices react to exogenous changes in claim probabilities. In other words,
given three or more deductible options, it is exogenous variation in premiums for a fixed µ
that allows us to pin down r and Ω(µ), and it is exogenous variation in claim probabilities
that allows us to map out Ω(µ) for all µ in the range of our data.
3.3.2 Exogenous Variation in Premiums and Claim Probabilities
Within each coverage, there is substantial variation in premiums and claim probabilities.
A key identifying assumption is that there is variation in premiums and claim probabilities
that is exogenous to the households’ risk preferences. In our estimation, we assume that a
household’s utility parameters–r and Ω(µ)–depend on a vector of observables Z that is a
strict subset of the variables that determine premiums and claim probabilities. Many of the
20Property 3 reads like a single crossing property. This is noteworthy in light of recent work that relies on
a single crossing condition to estimate risk preferences (e.g., Chiappori et al. 2012).
21Note that if the data included only two deductible options, as in Cohen and Einav (2007), we could not
separately identify r and Ω(µ) without making strong functional form assumptions about Ω(µ).
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variables outside Z that determine premiums and claim probabilities, such as protection class
and territory code,22 are arguably exogenous to the households’ risk preferences. In addition,
there are other variables outside Z that determine premiums but not claim probabilities,
including numerous discount programs, which also are arguably exogenous to the households’
risk preferences.
Given our choice of Z, there is substantial variation in premiums and claim probabilities
that is not explained by Z. In particular, regressions of premiums and predicted claim
probabilities on Z yield low coefficients of determination (R2). In the case of auto collision
coverage, for example, regressions of premiums (for coverage with a $500 deductible) on Z
and predicted claim probabilities on Z yield R2 of 0.16 and 0.34, respectively.23
In addition to the substantial variation in premiums and claim probabilities within a
coverage, there also is substantial variation in premiums and claim probabilities across cov-
erages. A key feature of the data is that for each household we observe deductible choices
for three coverages, and (even for a fixed Z) there is substantial variation in premiums and
claim probabilities across the three coverages. Thus, even if the within-coverage variation
in premiums and claim probabilities were insufficient in practice, we still might be able to
estimate the model using across-coverage variation.
4 Analysis with Homogenous Preferences
We begin our analysis by assuming homogeneous preferences–i.e., r and Ω(µ) are the same
for all households. This allows us to take a semi-nonparametric approach to estimating the
model without facing a curse of dimensionality. As a point of reference, we note that if we
do not allow for probability distortions–i.e., we restrict Ω(µ) = µ–the estimate for r is
0.0129 (standard error: 0.0004).
4.1 Estimates
We take three sieve approaches to estimating Ω(µ). In Model 1a, we estimate a Cheby-
shev polynomial expansion of ln Ω(µ), which naturally constrains Ω(µ) > 0. We consider
expansions up to the 20th degree, and select a quadratic on the basis of the Bayesian in-
formation criterion (BIC). In Model 1b, we estimate a Chebyshev polynomial expansion of
22Protection class gauges the effectiveness of local fire protection and building codes. Territory codes
are based on actuarial risk factors, such as traffic and weather patterns, population demographics, wildlife
density, and the cost of goods and services.
23They are even lower for auto comprehensive and home. In the case of auto comprehensive the coefficients
of determination are 0.07 and 0.31, and in the case of home they are 0.04 and 0.15.
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Ω(µ), which nests the case Ω(µ) = µ.24 As before, we consider expansions up to the 20th
degree. Here, the BIC selects a cubic. However, because the BIC for the quadratic and cubic
are essentially the same, we report results for the quadratic to facilitate direct comparisons
with Model 1a. In Model 1c, we estimate Ω(µ) using an 11-point cubic spline on the interval
(0, 0.20), wherein lie 99.4 percent of the predicted claim probabilities in the core sample.
Table 5 reports our results. The estimates for Ω(µ) indicate large probability dis-
tortions. To illustrate, Figure 2 depicts the estimated Ω(µ) for Models 1a, 1b, and 1c,
along with the 95 percent pointwise bootstrap confidence bands for Model 1c.25 In each
model, there is substantial overweighting of claim probabilities. In Model 1a, for example,
Ω̂(0.020) = 0.083, Ω̂(0.050) = 0.111, Ω̂(0.075) = 0.135, and Ω̂(0.100) = 0.156. In addi-
tion, there is only mild insensitivity to probability changes. For instance, in Model 1a,
[Ω̂(0.050)− Ω̂(0.020)]/[0.050− 0.020] = 0.933, [Ω̂(0.075)− Ω̂(0.050)]/[0.075− 0.050] = 0.960,
and [Ω̂(0.100)− Ω̂(0.075)]/[0.100− 0.075] = 0.840. Moreover, all three models imply nearly
identical distortions of claim probabilities between zero and 14 percent (wherein lie 96.7 per-
cent of the predicted claim probabilities in the core sample), and even for claim probabilities
greater than 14 percent the three models are statistically indistinguishable (Models 1a and
1b lie within the 95 percent confidence bands for Model 1c). Given this overweighting, the
estimates for r are smaller than without probability distortions. Specifically, r̂ is 0.00064,
0.00063, and 0.00049 in Models 1a, 1b, and 1c, respectively. Lastly, we note the estimates
for the scale of choice noise: σ̂L = 26.3, σ̂M = 17.5, and σ̂H = 68.5.
TABLE 5 & FIGURE 2
4.2 Statistical and Economic Significance
To assess the relative statistical importance of probability distortions and standard risk
aversion, we estimate restricted models and perform Vuong (1989) model selection tests.26
We find that a model with probability distortions alone is "better" at the 1 percent level
than a model with standard risk aversion alone. However, a likelihood ratio test rejects
at the 1 percent level both (i) the null hypothesis of standard risk neutrality (r = 0) for
Models 1a and 1b and (ii) the null hypothesis of no probability distortions (Ω(µ) = µ) for
24Here we impose the restriction that Ω(µ) > 0.
25Figure 2 shows the estimated Ω(µ) on the interval (0, 0.16), wherein lie 98.2 percent of the predicted
claim probabilities in the core sample.
26Vuong’s (1989) test allows one to select between two nonnested models on the basis of which best fits
the data. Neither model is assumed to be correctly specified. Vuong (1989) shows that testing whether one
model is significantly closer to the truth (its loglikelihood value is significantly greater) than another model
amounts to testing the null hypothesis that the loglikelihoods have the same expected value.
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Model 1b.27 This suggests that probability distortions and standard risk aversion both play
a statistically significant role.
To give a sense of the economic significance of our estimates for r and Ω(µ), we consider
the implications for a household’s maximum willingness to pay (WTP ) for lower deductibles.
Specifically, we consider a household’s WTP to reduce its deductible from $1000 to $500
when the premium for coverage with a $1000 deductible is $200. Table 6 displays WTP
for selected claim probabilities µ and several preference combinations. Column (1) displays
WTP for a risk neutral household. Columns (2) through (4) display WTP for preference
combinations using the estimates for r and Ω(µ) from Model 1a. Lastly, column (5) displays
WTP for a household with our estimated degree of standard risk aversion when we do
not allow for probability distortions. Comparing columns (2) through (4) reveals that our
estimated probability distortions have a larger economic impact than our estimated standard
risk aversion, except at claim probabilities at the high end of our data, where the impacts
are comparably large. Comparing columns (4) and (5) reveals that the best fit of a model
which features only standard risk aversion is overly sensitive to changes in claim probability.
TABLE 6
Lastly, to give a sense of the economic significance of our estimates for the scale of
choice noise (σL, σM , and σH), we consider the potential for such noise to affect households’
deductible choices. In particular, we use Model 1a to simulate–both with and without choice
noise–the deductible choices of the households in the core sample. Over 1000 iterations,
we find that the households’ "noisy" choices match their "noiseless" choices about half the
time: 56 percent in auto collision, 43 percent in auto comprehensive, and 50 percent in home.
Moreover, we find that households’ "noisy" choices are within one rank (i.e., one step up or
down on the menu of deductible options) of their "noiseless" choices more than four-fifths of
the time: 94 percent in collision, 82 percent in auto comprehensive, and 95 percent in home.
This suggests that choice noise, at the scale we estimate, is important but not dominant.28
4.3 Sources of Probability Distortions
There are a number of possible sources of the estimated probability distortions depicted in
Figure 2. In this section, we discuss what we learn from our estimated Ω(µ) about several
potential sources.
27We do not perform a likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis of no probability distortions for Model
1a because it does not nest the case Ω(µ) = µ.
28After all, with extreme noise, we would find match rates that are two to three times smaller, because
the probability that a household’s "noisy" choice would equal any given deductible would be 20 percent in
auto collision, 17 percent in auto comprehensive, and 25 percent in home.
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One potential source of probability distortions is probability weighting, whereby proba-
bilities are transformed into decision weights.29 Under a probability weighting model, and
adopting the rank-dependent approach of Quiggin (1982), the utility of deductible lottery
Ld is given by
U(Ld) = (1− pi (µ)) u (w − pd) + pi (µ) u (w − pd − d) , (4)
where pi(µ) is the probability weighting function. Clearly, equation (4) is equivalent to equa-
tion (1) with Ω(µ) = pi(µ). Insofar as Ω(µ) reflects probability weighting, our estimated
Ω(µ) is striking in its resemblance to the probability weighting function originally posited
by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). In particular, it is consistent with a probability weight-
ing function that exhibits overweighting of small probabilities, exhibits mild insensitivity
to changes in probabilities, and trends toward a positive intercept as µ approaches zero
(though we have relatively little data for µ < 0.01). By contrast, the probability weighting
functions later suggested by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Lattimore et al. (1992), and
Prelec (1998)–which are commonly used in the literature (e.g., Jullien and Salanié 2000;
Kliger and Levy 2009; Bruhin et al. 2010; Andrikogiannopoulou 2010)–will not fit our data
well, because they trend toward a zero intercept and typically exhibit oversensitivity for
probabilities less than five to ten percent.30
Another possible source of probability distortions is loss aversion. The original, "status
quo" loss aversion proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979)–wherein gains and losses are
defined relative to initial wealth–cannot explain aversion to risk in the context of insurance
deductible choices because all outcomes are losses relative to initial wealth. More recently,
however, Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007) and Sydnor (2010) have suggested that a form of "ratio-
nal expectations" loss aversion proposed by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006)–wherein gains and
losses are defined relative to expectations about outcomes–can explain the aversion to risk
manifested in insurance deductible choices. In the Appendix, we describe the Ko˝szegi-Rabin
(KR) model of loss aversion and derive its implications for deductible lotteries.31 Under the
29As we discuss in Section 7, in our data literal probability weighting is indistinguishable from systematic
risk misperceptions (i.e., incorrect subjective beliefs about claim probabilities).
30For instance, if we impose on Ω(µ) the one-parameter functional form proposed by Prelec (1998), we
estimate Prelec’s α = 0.7. This estimate implies that Ω′(µ) > 1.0 for µ < 0.075 and Ω′(µ) > 1.5 for
µ < 0.027.
31Specifically, we apply the concept of "choice-acclimating personal equilibrium" (CPE), which KR suggest
is appropriate for insurance choices because the insured commits to its policy choices well in advance of the
resolution of uncertainty. In addition, we explain that although the KR model contains two parameters, one
(λ) that captures the degree of loss aversion and one (η) that captures the importance of gain-loss utility
relative to standard utility, under CPE these parameters always appear as the product η(λ − 1), which we
label Λ.
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KR model, the utility of deductible lottery Ld is given by
U(Ld) = [(1− µ)u(w − pd) + µu(w − pd − d)] (5)
−Λ (1− µ)µ [u(w − pd)− u(w − pd − d)] .
The first bracketed term is merely the standard expected utility of Ld. The second bracketed
term reflects the expected disutility due to loss aversion, where Λ ≥ 0 captures the degree
of loss aversion (Λ = 0 means no loss aversion). When Λ > 0, the outcome of experiencing
a claim "looms larger" than the outcome of not experiencing a claim because the former is
perceived as a loss relative to the latter. Equation (5) is equivalent to equation (1) with
Ω(µ) = µ + Λ (1− µ)µ. If Λ > 0 then Ω(µ) 6= µ. Thus, KR loss aversion can generate
probability distortions. The probability distortions implied by KR loss aversion, however,
are qualitatively different from the probability distortions we estimate–see panel (a) of
Figure 3. In particular, the probability distortion function implied by KR loss aversion is
too steep in the range of our data and trends toward a zero intercept. Hence, KR loss
aversion alone cannot explain our data.
Probability distortions also can arise from disappointment aversion. In the Appendix, we
describe the model of disappointment aversion proposed by Gul (1991), in which disutility
arises when the outcome of a lottery is less than the certainty equivalent of the lottery.32
Under Gul’s model, the utility of deductible lottery Ld is given by
U(Ld) =
(
1−
µ(1 + β)
1 + βµ
)
u(w − pd) +
(
µ(1 + β)
1 + βµ
)
u(w − pd − d), (6)
where β ≥ 0 captures the degree of disappointment aversion (β = 0means no disappointment
aversion). When β > 0, the outcome of experiencing a claim is overweighted (relative to µ)
because of the disappointment associated therewith. Equation (6) is equivalent to equation
(1) with Ω(µ) = µ(1 + β)/(1 + βµ). If β > 0 then Ω(µ) 6= µ. Thus, Gul disappointment
aversion can generate probability distortions. Again, however, the probability distortions
implied by Gul disappointment aversion are qualitatively different from the probability dis-
tortions we estimate–see panel (b) of Figure 3. As before, the implied probability distortion
function is too steep and trends toward a zero intercept. Hence, Gul disappointment aversion
alone cannot explain our data.
Because we can "reject" the hypotheses that KR loss aversion alone or Gul disappoint-
ment aversion alone can explain our estimated probability distortions, our analysis provides
32In the Appendix, we explain that versions of the somewhat different approaches of Bell (1985) and
Loomes and Sugden (1986) imply probability distortions identical to those implied by KR loss aversion.
17
evidence that probability weighting (perhaps partly reflecting risk misperceptions) is playing
a key role in the households’ deductible choices.
Finally, we consider a combination of sources. In the Appendix, we derive that, if house-
holds have probability weighting pi(µ) and KR loss aversion Λ, then the utility of deductible
lottery Ld is given by
U(Ld) = [(1− pi(µ))u(w − pd) + pi(µ)u(w − pd − d)]
−Λ (1− pi(µ)) pi(µ) [u(w − pd)− u(w − pd − d)] ,
which is equivalent to equation (1) with Ω(µ) = pi(µ)[1 + Λ(1− pi(µ))]. From this equation,
it is clear that, unless we impose strong functional form assumptions on pi(µ), we cannot
separately identify Λ and pi(µ). Rather, the best we can do is to derive, for various values of
Λ, an implied probability weighting function pi(µ). Panel (c) of Figure 3 performs this exer-
cise. It reinforces our conclusion that KR loss aversion alone cannot explain our estimated
probability distortions, because it is clear from the figure that no value of Λ will generate an
implied pi(µ) that lies on the 45-degree line.33
FIGURE 3
5 Analysis with Heterogenous Preferences
In this section, we expand the model to permit heterogenous preferences. With heterogeneous
preferences, it is no longer feasible to take a semi-nonparametric approach to estimating the
model, due to the curse of dimensionality and to the computational burden of our estimation
procedure. Hence, we now take a parametric approach to Ω(µ). Because Models 1a, 1b, and
1c yield nearly identical results, and because it naturally constrains Ω(µ) > 0, throughout
this section we estimate a quadratic Chebyshev polynomial expansion of ln Ω(µ) (which is the
best fit in Model 1a). As before, we estimate equation (3) assuming that utility is specified
by equation (2) and that µij = µ̂ij, and we use combined data for all three coverages. We
assume that choice noise is independent of any observed or unobserved heterogeneity in
preferences, and as before we permit the scale of choice noise to vary across coverages.
We take three approaches to modeling heterogeneity in preferences. In Model 2, we allow
for observed heterogeneity in ri and Ωi(µ) by assuming
ln ri = βrZi and ln Ωi(µ) = βΩ,1Zi +
(
βΩ,2Zi
)
µ+
(
βΩ,3Zi
)
µ2,
33While we focus on a combination of probability weighting and KR loss aversion, a similar analysis of a
combination of probability weighting and Gul disappointment aversion yields analogous conclusiuons.
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where Zi comprises a constant plus the variables in Table 1. We estimate Model 2 via maxi-
mum likelihood, and the parameter vector to be estimated is θ ≡ (βr, βΩ,1, βΩ,2, βΩ,3, σL, σM , σH).
In Models 3 and 4, we allow for unobserved heterogeneity in ri and Ωi(µ). In particular,
we assume
ln ri = βrZi + ξr,i and ln Ωi(µ) = βΩ,1Zi +
(
βΩ,2Zi
)
µ+
(
βΩ,3Zi
)
µ2 + ξΩ,i,
where (
ξr,i
ξΩ,i
)
iid
∼ Normal
([
0
0
]
,Φ
)
, with Φ ≡
[
Φr Φr,Ω
Φr,Ω ΦΩ
]
.
In Model 3, we allow for only unobserved heterogeneity, and thus Zi is a constant. In Model
4, we allow for both unobserved and observed heterogeneity, and Zi comprises a constant
plus the variables in Table 1. We estimate Models 3 and 4 via Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC), and the parameters to be estimated are θ and Φ.34 Details regarding the MCMC
estimation procedure are set forth in the Appendix.35 After each estimation, we use the
estimates to assign fitted values of ri and Ωi(µ) to each household i.
36
Table 7 summarizes the estimates for Models 2, 3, and 4.37 For comparison, it also
restates the estimates from Model 1a. Figure 4 depicts the mean fitted value of Ω(µ) for
each model. For comparison, it also depicts the estimated Ω(µ) in Models 1a and 1c, along
with the 95 percent confidence bands for Model 1c.
TABLE 7 & FIGURE 4
The mean estimated probability distortions in Models 2, 3, and 4 are nearly identical
to each other and to the estimated probability distortions in Model 1. Hence, whether
we assume preferences are homogeneous or allow for observed or unobserved heterogeneity,
the main message is the same: large probability distortions characterized by substantial
overweighting of claim probabilities and only mild insensitivity to probability changes.
By contrast, the estimated degree of standard risk aversion is somewhat sensitive to the
modeling approach. In Model 2, the mean fitted value of r is 0.00073, slightly higher than
in Model 1a. In Models 3 and 4, the estimates for r are higher still–the mean fitted values
are 0.00156 and 0.00147, respectively.
34The resulting econometric model is a mixed multinomial logit (McFadden and Train 2000). Within the
literature on estimating risk preferences, a similar specification is employed by Andrikogiannopoulou (2010).
35The procedure closely follows Train (2009, ch. 12). The estimation was performed in MATLAB using a
modified version of Train’s software, "Mixed logit estimation by Bayesian methods." Convergence diagnostic
tests were run using the CODA package adapted for MATLAB by James P. LeSage.
36In the case of Models 3 and 4, the fitted values are calculated taking into account the estimates for Φ.
Specifically, r̂i = exp(β̂rZi + (Φ̂r/2)) and Ω̂i(µ) = exp(β̂Ω,1Zi + (β̂Ω,2Zi)µ+ (β̂Ω,3Zi)µ
2 + (Φ̂Ω/2)).
37The complete estimates are reported in Tables A.6, A.7, and A.8 in the Appendix.
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The estimates for the scale of choice noise are similarly sensitive. Whereas the estimates
for Model 2 differ only slightly from those in Model 1a, the estimates for Models 3 and 4
(though similar to each other) differ sizably from those in Model 1a–roughly speaking, σ̂L
and σ̂M are forty percent lower and σ̂H is forty percent higher. That said, the estimates for
each model display the same qualitative pattern: σ̂M < σ̂L << σ̂H .
Lastly, we make two observations about the estimated variance-covariance matrix of
unobserved heterogeneity. First, the variance estimates imply that there indeed is unobserved
heterogeneity in preferences. Consider, for instance, Model 3 (the message is the same for
Model 4, although the calculations are more involved because of the presence of observed
heterogeneity). For standard risk aversion, the estimate of Φˆr = 0.55 implies that the 2.5th,
25th, 75th, and 97.5th percentiles are 0.00028, 0.00072, 0.00195, and 0.00507, respectively.
For probability distortions, the estimate of ΦˆΩ = 0.37 implies that the 2.5th, 25th, 75th, and
97.5th pointwise percentiles are 0.25Ω(µ), 0.55Ω(µ), 1.25Ω(µ), and 2.73Ω(µ), where Ω(µ)
is the mean fitted probability distortion depicted in Figure 4. This substantial unobserved
heterogeneity is consistent with similar findings on standard risk aversion by Cohen and Einav
(2007) and on cumulative prospect theory parameters by Andrikogiannopoulou (2010).38 We
note, however, that we find less unobserved heterogeneity in standard risk aversion than
do Cohen and Einav (2007).39 Despite this unobserved heterogeneity, our main message
persists: the data is best explained by large probability distortions among the majority of
households. Furthermore, our conclusions regarding the sources of probability distortions–
and in particular that neither KR loss aversion alone nor Gul disappointment aversion alone
can explain our estimated probability distortions–also persist.
Our second observation is that the covariance estimate implies a negative correlation
between unobserved heterogeneity in r and Ω(µ): −0.49 in both Models 3 and 4.40 This
suggests that the unexplained variation in the households’ deductible choices (after control-
ling for premiums, claim probabilities, and observed heterogeneity) is best explained not by
heterogeneity in their "overall" aversion to risk but rather by heterogeneity in their combi-
38It also is consistent with findings by Chiappori et al. (2012) and Gandhi and Serrano-Padial (2012), who
use market-level gambling data to study, respectively, heterogeneity in preferences and heterogeneity in beliefs
(which, incidentally, feature non-vanishing chances being assigned to events with vanishing probabilities).
39This is perhaps not surprising given that we have a second dimension of unobserved heterogeneity in
preferences. Because Andrikogiannopoulou (2010) estimates a very different model–which in particular
assumes no standard risk aversion and imposes a functional form for probability weighting that reflects a
very different shape from ours–it is difficult to compare the magnitude of our estimates of unobserved
heterogeneity with those in her paper.
40To be clear, Table 7 reports that the implied correlation between ξr,i and ξΩ,i is −0.72. Given the
log-linear specifications for ri and Ωi(µ), this implies that the correlation between ri and Ωi(µ) due to
unobserved heterogeneity is −0.49.
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nations of standard risk aversion and probability distortions. After all, if such unexplained
variation in deductible choices were best explained by heterogeneity in overall aversion to
risk, we would expect a positive correlation because moving r and Ω(µ) in the same direction
is the most "efficient" way of varying overall aversion to risk. However, if there were little
heterogeneity in overall aversion to risk, moving r and Ω(µ) in opposite directions would be
necessary to explain such variation in deductible choices.
6 Sensitivity Analysis
Our main analysis yields a clear main message: large probability distortions characterized by
substantial overweighting and mild insensitivity. Moreover, our main analysis suggests that
this message is robust to different approaches to modeling heterogeneity in preferences. In
this section, we further investigate the sensitivity of this message, and we find that it is robust
to various other modeling assumptions. By contrast, we generally find that the estimates for
standard risk aversion are more sensitive. To conserve space, we only summarize the results
of the sensitivity analysis below. The complete results are available in the Appendix (Tables
A.9 through A.22). In most of the sensitivity analysis, we restrict attention to Models 2 and
3. (Recall that Model 2 allows for observed heterogeneity in preferences and Model 3 allows
for unobserved heterogeneity in preferences.) We do not re-estimate Model 4 because of the
extreme computational burden of estimating the model with both observed and unobserved
heterogeneity,41 and also because Models 2, 3 and 4 (not to mention Model 1) all yield the
same main message.
6.1 Unobserved Heterogeneity in Risk
In our main analysis, we assume that the households’ subjective claim probabilities corre-
spond to our predicted claim probabilities, which reflect only observed heterogeneity. The
results of our claim rate regressions, however, imply that there is unobserved heterogeneity.
In this section, we take two approaches to accounting for this unobserved heterogeneity.
In our first approach, we assume that unobserved heterogeneity in risk is not correlated
with unobserved heterogeneity in preferences. With this assumption, we use the results of
the claim rate regressions to assign to each household a predicted distribution of claim prob-
abilities, F̂ (µ), and then integrate over F̂ (µ) to construct the likelihood function. Column
(a) of Table 8 summarizes the estimates for Models 2 and 3 when we allow for unobserved
41Estimating Model 4 takes approximately one week (on a Dell Precision 7500 with dual XEON 5680
processors with 24GB of memory). In comparison, estimating Model 3 takes approximately one day, and
estimating Model 2 takes less than an hour.
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heterogeneity in risk in this way. For comparison, the table also restates the benchmark
estimates. Our main message remains unchanged. The estimates for Ω(µ) indicate similarly
large probability distortions–see Figure A.1 in the Appendix. The estimates for r indicate
levels of standard risk aversion that are somewhat higher than the benchmark estimates.
Lastly, we note that the estimates for the scale of choice noise, as well as the estimates for
Φ, are similar to the benchmark estimates.
TABLE 8
In our second approach, we allow for correlation between unobserved heterogeneity in
risk and unobserved heterogeneity in preferences. In principle, we could estimate Model 3
with the addition of unobserved heterogeneity in claim probabilities and permit a flexible
correlation structure among the various sources of unobserved heterogeneity. Doing so,
however, would impose an undue computational burden and put a strain on identification.
Instead, we estimate the following model:
ln ri = r + ξr,i and Ωij(µ) = a+ bµ̂ij exp(ξb,ij),
where (ξr,i, ξb,iL, ξb,iM , ξb,iH)
iid
∼ Normal(0,Ψ) and the parameters to be estimated are r, a,
b, and Ψ. Relative to Model 3, this model imposes a more restrictive functional form on
Ω(µ) and also alters the way in which unobserved heterogeneity enters into Ω(µ). However,
it has several compensating virtues. Perhaps most important, given the way ξb enters the
model, it can be interpreted as unobserved heterogeneity in probability distortions (as in
our first approach), but it also can be interpreted as unobserved heterogeneity in subjective
risk perceptions (i.e., subjective claim probabilities). Thus, the model nests–when a = 0
and b = 1–a standard expected utility model with no probability distortions but with
unobserved heterogeneity in both risk and standard risk aversion (and a flexible correlation
structure).42 In addition, it allows for coverage-specific unobserved heterogeneity, and it is
simple and computationally tractable.
Table A.11 in the Appendix reports our MCMC estimates for this model. For Ω(µ), we
obtain an intercept of â = 0.041 (standard error: 0.002) and a slope of b̂ = 0.864 (standard
error: 0.029). These estimates clearly reject a standard expected utility model and yield
probability distortions that are quite similar to Model 3.43 Hence, our main message remains
42Technically, this nesting is complete only if we further impose that (ξr,i, ξb,iL, ξb,iM , ξb,iH)
iid
∼
Normal(Υ,Ψ), where Υj = −Ψjj/2. If we impose this restriction, the results are very similar to those
we report (which assume Υ = 0).
43The somewhat lower intercept is compensated by the higher variance of the unobserved heterogeneity
terms, Ψb, which imply a higher E(exp(ξb)).
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unchanged. The estimates for standard risk aversion and for the scale of choice noise are
also similar to Model 3. The estimates for the variance-covariance matrix Ψ imply much
higher variances of unobserved heterogeneity in risk than do the estimates for φ from the
claim rate regressions, suggesting either that there is substantial unobserved heterogeneity
in probability distortions or that there indeed is unobserved heterogeneity in subjective
risk perceptions beyond the unobserved heterogeneity in objective risk. Interestingly, the
variance estimates are quite similar for auto collision and home, but substantially higher for
auto comprehensive, perhaps suggesting that households have more accurate beliefs about
risk in domains in which adverse events occur more frequently. Lastly, the cross-coverage
correlations of unobserved heterogeneity in risk are all high, supporting our benchmark
modeling assumption that there is a household-specific component in probability distortions
that is common across coverages.
Finally, we note that unobserved heterogeneity in risk creates an adverse selection prob-
lem for the insurance company. However, adverse selection from the company’s perspective
is irrelevant to our analysis. What matters here is to account for selection based on unob-
servable risk, which is precisely what we do.
6.2 Restricted Choice Noise
In the model, we use choice noise to account for observationally equivalent households choos-
ing different deductibles, and for individual households making "inconsistent" choices across
coverages. In this section, we investigate the sensitivity of our main message to this mod-
eling choice by restricting the scale of choice noise. Column (b) of Table 8 summarizes the
estimates for Models 2 and 3 when we restrict the scale of choice noise to half its estimated
magnitude (i.e., we fix σj ≡
1
2
σ̂j). Our main message is unchanged. Indeed, the estimated
probability distortions become even more pronounced–see Figure A.2 in the Appendix. At
the same time, the estimate for standard risk aversion becomes extremely small.
6.3 CRRA Utility
In our analysis, we use a second-order Taylor expansion of the utility function. As a check of
this approach, we consider CRRA utility, u(w) = w1−ρ/(1−ρ), where ρ > 0 is the coefficient
of relative risk aversion. The CRRA family is "the most widely used parametric family for
fitting utility functions to data" (Wakker 2008). With CRRA utility, equation (1) becomes
U(Ld) = (1− Ω(µ))
(w − pd)
1−ρ
(1− ρ)
+ Ω(µ)
(w − pd − d)
1−ρ
(1− ρ)
.
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A disadvantage of CRRA utility is that it requires wealth as an input, and moreover
there surely is heterogeneity in wealth across the households in our core sample. To account
for these issues, we assume that (i) wealth is proportional to home value and (ii) average
wealth is $33,000 (approximately equal to 2010 U.S. per capita disposable personal income).
The average home value in the core sample is approximately $191,000. Thus, we assume
w = (33/191)× (home value).44
We re-estimate Models 2 and 3.45 For Model 2, we assume ln ρ = βρZi, where Zi
comprises a constant plus the variables in Table 1. For Model 3, we assume ln ρ = βρ + ξρ,i.
We otherwise proceed exactly as described in Section 5. Panel (c) of Table 8 summarizes the
estimates, and Figure A.3 in the Appendix depicts the mean estimated Ω(µ) for each model.
The main message is much the same: we find large probability distortions characterized by
substantial overweighting and mild insensitivity. In fact, the probability distortions become
somewhat more pronounced. At the same time, the estimates for standard risk aversion
become very small. The mean fitted values of ρ are 0.37 and 0.21 in Models 2 and 3,
respectively. Evaluated at average wealth of $33,000, these estimates imply a coefficient of
absolute risk aversion on the order of r = 0.00001.
6.4 Moral Hazard
Throughout our analysis, we assume that deductible choice does not influence claim risk.
That is, we assume there is no deductible-related moral hazard. In this section, we assess
this assumption.
There are two types of moral hazard that might operate in our setting. First, a house-
hold’s deductible choice might influence its incentives to take care (ex ante moral hazard).
Second, a household’s deductible choice might influence its incentives to file a claim after
experiencing a loss (ex post moral hazard), especially if its premium is experience rated or
if the loss results in a "nil" claim (i.e., a claim that does not exceed its deductible). For
either type of moral hazard, the incentive to alter behavior–i.e., take more care or file fewer
claims–is stronger for households with larger deductibles. Hence, we investigate whether
moral hazard is a significant issue in our data by examining whether our predicted claim
probabilities change if we exclude households with high deductibles.
Specifically, we re-run our claim rate regressions using a restricted sample of the full
data set in which we drop all household-coverage-year records with deductibles of $1000 or
44We also restrict households to have positive wealth. The results presented here restrict w ≥ $12, 000
(i.e., if a household’s implied w is less than $12,000, we assign it a wealth of $12,000). We investigated
sensitivity to this cutoff, and it matters very little (because very few households are affected).
45To enable a global search over ρ, we scale the model by (33, 000)ρ. Locally, the results are indistinguish-
able from those obtained without re-scaling.
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larger.46 We then use the new estimates to generate revised predicted claim probabilities for
all households in the core sample (including those with deductibles of $1000 or larger). Com-
paring the revised predicted claim rates with the benchmark predicted claim rates, we find
that they are essentially indistinguishable–in each coverage, pairwise correlations exceed
0.995 and linear regressions yield intercepts less than 0.001 and coefficients of determination
(R2) greater than 0.99. Moreover, the estimates of the variance of unobserved heterogeneity
in claim rates are nearly identical.47 Not surprisingly, if we re-estimate our baseline model
using the revised predicted claim probabilities, the results are virtually identical.
The foregoing analysis suggests that moral hazard is not a significant issue in our data.
This is perhaps not surprising, for two reasons. First, the empirical evidence on moral hazard
in auto insurance markets is mixed. (We are not aware of any empirical evidence on moral
hazard in home insurance markets.). Most studies that use "positive correlation" tests of
asymmetric information in auto insurance do not find evidence of a correlation between
coverage and risk (e.g., Chiappori and Salanié 2000; for a recent review of the literature, see
Cohen and Siegelman 2010).48 Second, there are theoretical reasons to discount the force
of moral hazard in our setting. In particular, because deductibles are small relative to the
overall level of coverage, ex ante moral hazard strikes us as implausible in our setting.49
As for ex post moral hazard, households have countervailing incentives to file claims no
matter the size of the loss–under the terms of the company’s policies, if a household fails to
report a claimable event (especially an event that is a matter of public record–e.g., collision
events typically entail police reports), it risks denial of all forms of coverage (notably liability
coverage) for such event and also cancellation (or nonrenewal) of its policy.
Finally, we note that, even if our predicted claim rates are roughly correct, the possibility
of nil claims could bias our results, as they violate our assumption that every claim exceeds
the highest available deductible (which underlies how we define the deductible lotteries). To
investigate this potential, we re-estimate Model 1a under the extreme counterfactual assump-
46We draw the line at the $1000 deductible and not the $500 deductible because realistically it is difficult
to imagine claimable events that result in losses smaller than $500.
47The revised estimates are 0.22, 0.56, and 0.44 in auto collision, auto comprehensive, and home, respec-
tively, whereas the corresponding benchmark estimates are 0.22, 0.57, and 0.45.
48Beginning with Abbring et al. (2003a,b), a second strand of literature tests for moral hazard in longi-
tudinal auto insurance data using various dynamic approaches. Abbring et al. (2003b) find no evidence of
moral hazard in French data. A handful of subsequent studies present some evidence of moral hazard using
data from Canada and Europe. The only study of which we are aware that uses U.S. data is Israel (2004),
which reports a small moral hazard effect for drivers in Illinois. Each of these studies, however, identifies a
moral hazard effect with respect to either liability coverage or a composite coverage that confounds liability
coverage with other coverages. None of them identifies a separate moral hazard attributable to the choice of
deductible in the auto coverages we study.
49We note that Cohen and Einav (2007) reach the same conclusion. Furthermore, we note that the principal
justification for deductibles is the insurer’s administrative costs (Arrow 1963).
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tion that claimable events invariably result in losses between $500 and $1000, specifically
$750. With this assumption, our model is unchanged except that the lottery associated with
a $1000 deductible becomes L1000 ≡ (−p1000, 1− µ;−p1000 − 750, µ). Because this change
makes the $1000 deductible more attractive, we will need more overall aversion to risk to ex-
plain households choosing smaller deductibles–i.e., r or Ω(µ) will need to increase. It turns
out that the estimates for Ω(µ) indicate very similar probability distortions–see Figure A.4
in the Appendix. What changes is the estimate for standard risk aversion: r̂ increases to
0.002. This suggests that our main message is robust to the possibility of nil claims.
6.5 Additional Sensitivity Checks
In the Appendix, we report the results of several additional sensitivity checks, in which we
consider: constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility; alternative samples of the data;
restricted menus of deductible options; and alternative assumptions about the structure of
choice noise. In each case, the estimates indicate probability distortions that are similar to
the benchmark, further reinforcing our main message.
7 Discussion
We develop a structural model of risky choice that permits standard risk aversion and non-
standard probability distortions, and we estimate the model using data on households’ de-
ductible choices in auto and home insurance. We find that large probability distortions–
characterized by substantial overweighting of small probabilities and only mild insensitiv-
ity to probability changes–play a statistically and economically significant role in explain-
ing households’ deductible choices. Our results yield important insights about the possible
sources of these probability distortions. In particular, our analysis offers evidence of prob-
ability weighting, and suggests a probability weighting function that closely resembles the
form originally suggested by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). In addition, we can "reject"
the hypothesis that KR loss aversion alone or Gul disappointment aversion alone can explain
our estimated probability distortions, though we cannot say whether they might be playing
a role in conjunction with probability weighting.
Perhaps the main takeaway of the paper is that economists should pay greater attention
to the question of how people evaluate risk. Prospect theory incorporates two key features:
a value function that describes how people evaluate outcomes and a probability weighting
function that describes how people evaluate risk. The behavioral literature, however, has
focused primarily on the value function, and there has been relatively little focus on prob-
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ability weighting.50 In light of our work, as well as other recent work that reaches similar
conclusions using different data and methods, it seems clear that future research on decision
making under uncertainty should focus more attention on probability weighting.51
Another takeaway relates to Rabin’s (2000) critique of expected utility theory. Rabin
demonstrates that reliance on the expected utility model to explain aversion to moderate-
stakes risk is problematic, because the "estimated" model would imply an implausible de-
gree of risk aversion over large-stakes risk.52 Indeed, when we estimate an expected utility
model–which does not permit probability distortions–our estimate of standard risk aver-
sion is "too large" in the Rabin sense. However, when we estimate our model–which permits
probability distortions–there is far less standard risk aversion. This suggests that it may be
possible–contrary to what some have argued–to resolve Rabin’s anomaly without moving
to models that impose zero standard risk aversion and use a non-standard value function to
explain aversion to risk.
That said, it is worth highlighting certain limitations of our analysis. An important
limitation is that, while our analysis clearly indicates that a lot of "action" lies in how people
evaluate risk, it does not enable us to say whether households are engaging in probability
weighting per se or whether their subjective beliefs about risk simply do not correspond
to the objective probabilities.53 In some ways, this distinction is not important, because
it is irrelevant for predicting simple risky choices like those we study in this paper. But
in other ways, this distinction is quite relevant. Notably, the arguments in favor of policy
interventions to educate households about the risks they face have more purchase if our
estimated probability distortions reflect risk misperceptions. They have less purchase, and
perhaps none, if our estimated probability distortions reflect probability weighting.
Another important limitation is that our analysis relies exclusively on insurance de-
ductible choices, and hence we urge caution when generalizing our conclusions to other do-
mains. In particular, the vast majority of the claim probabilities we observe lie between zero
and sixteen percent, and thus our analysis implies little about what probability distortions
50Two prominent review papers–an early paper that helped set the agenda for behavioral economics
(Rabin 1998) and a recent paper that surveys the current state of empirical behavioral economics (DellaVigna
2009)–contain almost no discussion of probability weighting. The behavioral finance literature has paid more
attention to probability weighting (see, e.g., Barberis and Huang 2008; Barberis 2012)
51Indeed, Prelec (2000) conjectured that "probability nonlinearity will eventually be recognized as a more
important determinant of risk attitudes than money nonlinearity."
52More narrowly, Drèze (1981) and Sydnor (2010) describe how real-world insurance deductibles seem to
imply "too much" risk aversion.
53Relatedly, although probability weighting is a natural candidate for explaining the probability distortions
that we find, other mechanisms, such as ambiguity aversion, also could give rise to similar probability
distortions. In fact, Fellner (1961) suggests using "distorted probabilities" to model the aversion to ambiguity
in the Ellsberg (1961) paradox.
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might look like outside that range. While we suspect that our main message would resonate
in many domains beyond insurance deductible choices that involve similar probabilities, we
hesitate to make any conjectures about settings where larger probabilities are involved.
Finally, we highlight a natural question that arises from our analysis: Are firms aware
of the nature of households’ risk preferences and do they react optimally to these risk pref-
erences? Investigating this question would require significant further thought. Even if we
thought that the insurance company were a risk neutral expected profit maximizer, it would
be too simplistic to assume that it merely maximizes the (negative) expected value of the
deductible lottery chosen by households in our setting. Optimal insurance contracts also
depend on the legal restrictions imposed by regulators, the nature of competition with other
insurance companies, and the nature of an insurance company’s costs (for underwriting poli-
cies, servicing claims, etc.). Moreover, insurance companies care also about dynamic demand,
which is something we have not considered in this paper. Hence, we view this question as
beyond the scope of the present paper, but an important question for future research.
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Figure 1: Empirical Density Functions for Predicted Claim Probabilities
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Figure 2: Estimated Ω(µ) — Model 1
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(a) KR loss aversion
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(c) Probability weighting and KR loss aversion
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Figure 3: Sources of Probability Distortions
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Figure 4: Mean Estimated Ω(µ) — Models 2, 3, and 4
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A Coverage Descriptions
Auto collision coverage pays for damage to the insured vehicle caused by a collision with
another vehicle or object, without regard to fault. Auto comprehensive coverage pays for
damage to the insured vehicle from all other causes (e.g., theft, fire, flood, windstorm, glass
breakage, vandalism, hitting or being hit by an animal, or by falling or flying objects),
without regard to fault. If the insured vehicle is stolen, auto comprehensive coverage also
provides a certain amount per day for transportation expenses (e.g., rental car or public
transportation). Home all perils coverage pays for damage to the insured home from all
causes (e.g., fire, windstorm, hail, tornadoes, vandalism, or smoke damage), except those
that are specifically excluded (e.g., flood, earthquake, or war). For simplicity, we often refer
to home all perils merely as home.
B Identification
In this section, we prove Properties 1, 2, and 3 from Section 3.3.1. Take any three deductible
options a, b, c ∈ D, with a > b > c, and consider a household with premium pa for deductible
a and claim probability µ. The household’s r and Ω(µ) determine the premium p˜b that
makes the household indifferent between deductibles a and b, as well as the premium p˜c that
makes the household indifferent between deductibles a and c. Notice that p˜b−pa reflects the
household’s maximum willingness to pay (WTP ) to reduce its deductible from a to b, and
p˜c− p˜b reflects the household’s additionalWTP to reduce its deductible from b to c. In what
follows, we simplify notation by suppressing the explicit dependence of p˜b and p˜c on pa, µ,
r, and Ω(µ). We also suppress the argument of Ω. In addition, let La denote the deductible
lottery associated with deductible a at premium pa.
Recall equation (2) from Section 3.1:
U(Ld) = − [pd + Ωd]−
r
2
[
(1− Ω) (pd)
2 + Ω (pd + d)
2] .
Define p(x) as the premium for deductible x such that the household is indifferent between
the resulting lottery and lottery La. Hence, p(b) = p˜b and p(c) = p˜c. Applying equation (2),
p(x) is defined by each of the following equations (both of which we use below):1
− p(x)− Ωx−
r
2
[
(1− Ω)(p(x))2 + Ω(p(x) + x)2
]
= U(La) (A.1)
1These equations are equivalent, where the latter merely expands U(La) and rearranges terms.
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(p(x)− pa)− Ω (a− x) +
r
2
(p(x)2 − p2a) + Ω
r
2
{
(x2 − a2) + 2(p(x)x− paa)
}
= 0. (A.2)
For the proofs below, it is useful to define W and V as
W (p, x, r,Ω) ≡ −p− Ωx−
r
2
[
(1− Ω)(p)2 + Ω(p+ x)2
]
V (p, x, r,Ω) ≡ (p− pa)− Ω (a− x) +
r
2
(p2 − p2a) + Ω
r
2
{
(x2 − a2) + 2(px− paa)
}
.
Our first lemma establishes that p(x) is well behaved.
Lemma 1. For any r ≥ 0, Ω ∈ (0, 1), pa > 0, and x ≤ a, p(x) is a continuous and
differentiable function with dp/dx < 0 (and thus p(c) > p(b) > pa).
It is straightforward to derive that W is twice differentiable and satisfies the conditions
of the implicit function theorem. Thus p(x) is a continuous and differentiable function, and
dp
dx
=
−∂W
∂x
∂W
∂p
=
−Ω [1 + rp(x) + rx)]
1 + rp(x) + rΩx
< 0.
Our second lemma states that standard risk aversion implies that a household’s WTP to
reduce its deductible is strictly greater than the expected reduction in the deductible paid
(evaluated at a claim probability of Ω).
Lemma 2. For any x′ < x ≤ a, if r = 0 then p(x′) − p(x) = Ω(x − x′), and if r > 0 then
p(x′)− p(x) > Ω(x− x′).
Proof. The result for r = 0 is straightforward. For r > 0, define V˜ as
V˜ (p, x′, r,Ω) ≡ [p− p(x)]− Ω (x− x′) +
r
2
(p2 − p(x)2) + Ω
r
2
{
(x′2 − x2) + 2(px′ − p(x)x)
}
,
in which case p(x′) is defined by V˜ (p(x′), x′, r,Ω) = 0. Note that p = Ω(x−x′)+p(x) implies
V˜ (p, x′, r,Ω) ≡ [(Ω(x− x′) + p(x))− p(x)]− Ω (x− x′) +
r
2
((Ω(x− x′) + p(x))2 − (p(x))2)
+Ω
r
2
{
(x′2 − x2) + 2((Ω(x− x′) + p(x))x′ − p(x)x)
}
=
r
2
(Ω2(x− x′)2 + 2p(x)Ω(x− x′))
+Ω
r
2
{
(x′2 − x2) + 2(Ω(x− x′)x′ + p(x)(x′ − x))
}
=
r
2
Ω(x− x′)[Ω(x+ x′)− (x+ x′)] < 0.
Since ∂V˜ /∂p = 1 + rp+ Ωrx′ > 0, it follows that p(x′) > Ω(x− x′) + p(x).
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Property 1 establishes the relationship between the magnitude of willingness to pay and
risk preferences.
Property 1. For any x < a, p(x) is strictly increasing in r and Ω.
Proof. By implicit function theorem:
∂p(x)
∂r
=
−∂V
∂r
∂V
∂p
and
∂p(x)
∂Ω
=
−∂V
∂Ω
∂V
∂p
.
Note that
∂V
∂r
= −
1
r
[(p(x)− pa)− Ω (a− x)] < 0,
where the equality uses equation (A.2) and the inequality follows from Lemma 2. Note
further that
∂V
∂Ω
= −
1
Ω
[(p(x)− pa) +
r
2
(p(x)2 − p2a)] < 0,
where the equality uses equation (A.2) and the inequality follows from Lemma 1. Finally,
given that ∂V/∂p = 1 + rp+ Ωrx > 0, it follows that ∂p(x)
∂r
> 0 and ∂p(x)
∂Ω
> 0.
We next establish Property 2, which shows that a risk averse household’s WTP to avoid
an incremental loss depends positively on the magnitude of the absolute loss.
Property 2. For any fixed Ω(µ), r = 0 implies p(b)−pa
p(c)−p(b)
= a−b
b−c
, and the ratio p(b)−pa
p(c)−p(b)
is
strictly increasing in r.
Proof. The result for r = 0 is straightforward. As a preliminary step in proving the second
part, we first prove that, for any r > 0, p(b)−pa
p(c)−p(b)
> a−b
b−c
. From Lemma 1, p(x) is continuous
and differentiable, and thus
p(b)− pa =
∫ a
b
(
−
dp
dx
)
dx and p(c)− p(b) =
∫ b
c
(
−
dp
dx
)
dx.
From the proof of Lemma 1, − dp
dx
= Ω[1+rp(x)+rx]
1+rp(x)+rΩx
> 0, and thus
d
[
− dp
dx
]
dx
= Ω
r(1− Ω)(1 + rp− rx dp
dx
)
[1 + rp(x) + rΩx]2
> 0.
In words, − dp
dx
reflects the household’s marginal willingness to pay to reduce its deductible,
and − dp
dx
> 0 reflects that a household is indeed willing to pay a higher premium to reduce its
deductible. More importantly, d
[
− dp
dx
]
/dx > 0 reflects that the larger is its deductible, the
larger is the household’s marginal willingness to pay to reduce that deductible (or equivalently
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the smaller is its deductible, the smaller is the household’s marginal willingness to pay to
reduce that deductible). Finally, d
[
− dp
dx
]
/dx > 0 implies
p(b)− pa =
∫ a
b
(
−
dp
dx
)
dx > (a− b)
(
−
dp
dx
∣∣∣∣
x=b
)
p(c)− p(b) =
∫ b
c
(
−
dp
dx
)
dx < (b− c)
(
−
dp
dx
∣∣∣∣
x=b
)
which together imply p(b)−pa
p(c)−p(b)
> a−b
b−c
. With this result in hand, we now prove that p(b)−pa
p(c)−p(b)
is
strictly increasing in r. Note that d
(
p(b)−pa
p(c)−p(b)
)
/dr > 0 if and only if 1
p(b)−pa
∂p(b)
∂r
> 1
p(c)−pa
∂p(c)
∂r
.
Applying ∂p(x)
∂r
from the proof of Property 1,
1
p(b)− pa
∂p(b)
∂r
=
1
p(b)− pa
1
r
[(p(b)− pa)− Ω(a− b)]
1 + rp(b) + Ωrb
,
1
p(c)− pa
∂p(c)
∂r
=
1
p(c)− pa
1
r
[(p(c)− pa)− Ω(a− c)]
1 + rp(c) + Ωrc
.
We have
1
p(b)− pa
[(p(b)− pa)− Ω(a− b)] >
1
p(c)− pa
[(p(c)− pa)− Ω(a− c)] ,
because
(p(c)− pa) [(p(b)− pa)− Ω(a− b)] > (p(b)− pa) [(p(c)− pa)− Ω(a− c)]
⇐⇒
(p(b)− pa)
a− b
>
(p(c)− pa)
a− c
where the last inequality follows from the result above–because (p(c)−pa)
a−c
is a convex com-
bination of (p(b)−pa)
a−b
and (p(c)−p(b))
b−c
. Finally, we have 1 + rp(b) + Ωrb < 1 + rp(c) + Ωrc,
because
rp(b) + Ωrb < rp(c) + Ωrc
⇐⇒ Ω(b− c) < p(c)− p(b),
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 2. The result follows.
We conclude with the key property for identification, which establishes that different
pairs of r and Ω have different implications for willingness to pay (provided there are at least
three deductible options on the menu).
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Property 3. If p(b) − pa is the same for (r,Ω(µ)) and (r
′,Ω(µ)′) with r < r′ (and thus
Ω(µ) > Ω(µ)′), then p(c)− p(b) is larger for (r,Ω(µ)) than for (r′,Ω(µ)′).
Proof. For a fixed p(b), define Ωb(r) by V (p(b), b, r,Ωb(r)) = 0, so that any pair (r,Ωb(r))
yields the same p(b) and thus the same p(b)− pa. Then
dΩb
dr
=
−∂V
∂r
∂V
∂Ω
= −
1
r
[
(p(b)− pa)− Ω
b(r)(a− b)
]
1
Ωb(r)
[
(p(b)− pa) +
r
2
(p(b)2 − p2a)
] .
Next, define pˇc(r) by V (pˇc(r), c, r,Ω
b(r)) = 0, so that pˇc(r) is the p(c) associated with
pair (r,Ωb(r)). The goal is to show that dpˇc(r)/dr < 0, from which the result follows.
Differentiating V (pˇc(r), c, r,Ω
b(r)) = 0 yields
d
[
V (pˇc(r), c, r,Ω
b(r))
]
dr
=
∂V
∂p
dpˇc(r)
dr
+
∂V
∂r
+
∂V
∂Ω
dΩb
dr
= 0.
Note that
∂V
∂r
+
∂V
∂Ω
dΩb
dr
= −
1
r
[
(pˇc(r)− pa)− Ω
b(r)(a− c)
]
+
1
Ωb(r)
[
(pˇc(r)− pa) +
r
2
(pˇc(r)
2 − p2a)
] 1
r
[
(p(b)− pa)− Ω
b(r)(a− b)
]
1
Ωb(r)
[
(p(b)− pa) +
r
2
(p(b)2 − p2a)
] .
We have
[
(pˇc(r)− pa)− Ω
b(r)(a− c)
]
<
(
pˇc(r)− pa
p(b)− pa
)[
(p(b)− pa)− Ω
b(r)(a− b)
]
as in the proof of Property 2. In addition,[
(pˇc(r)− pa) +
r
2
(pˇc(r)
2 − p2a)
][
(p(b)− pa) +
r
2
(p(b)2 − p2a)
] > ( pˇc(r)− pa
p(b)− pa
)
because
(p(b)− pa)(pˇc(r)
2 − p2a) > (pˇc(r)− pa)
(
p(b)2 − p2a
)
⇐⇒ (p(b)− pa)(pˇc(r)− pa)(pˇc(r) + pa) > (pˇc(r)− pa)(p(b)− pa) (p(b) + pa)
⇐⇒ pˇc(r) > p(b),
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 1. Together, these imply ∂V
∂r
+ ∂V
∂Ω
dΩb
dr
> 0, and
therefore ∂V
∂p
dpˇc(r)
dr
< 0. Hence, ∂V
∂p
> 0 implies dpˇc(r)
dr
< 0, and the result follows.
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C Sources of Probability Distortions
Throughout our main analysis, we assume that utility of deductible lottery Ld is given by
U(Ld) = (1− Ω(µ))u(w − pd) + Ω(µ)u(w − pd − d), (A.3)
where Ω(µ) reflects probability distortions. As we discuss in Section 4.3, there are a number
of possible sources of probability distortions. In this section, we describe the details of models
that can generate the probability distortions in equation (A.3).
C.1 Probability Weighting
One potential source of probability distortions is probability weighting, whereby probabilities
are transformed into decision weights. Under a probability weighting model, and adopting
the rank-dependent approach of Quiggin (1982), the utility of deductible lottery Ld is
U(Ld) = (1− pi(µ))u(w − pd) + pi(µ)u(w − pd − d), (A.4)
where pi(µ) is the probability weighting function. Clearly, equation (A.4) is equivalent to
equation (A.3) with Ω(µ) = pi(µ).
Over the years, several functional forms for pi(µ) have been proposed. A seminal paper
in the literature is Kahneman and Tversky (1979), which proposes that the probability
weighting function should exhibit (i) overweighting of small probabilities, (ii) underweighting
of large probabilities, (iii) some insensitivity to probability changes (slope less than one), and
(iv) discontinuities at µ = 0 and µ = 1. Later papers in the literature suggest functional
forms that eliminate feature (iv) (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Lattimore et al. 1992;
Prelec 1998). These all entail an oversensitivity to probability changes (slope greater than
one) for µ close to zero or one, where "close" typically (for the authors’ suggested parameter
values) includes the bulk of the claim probabilities in our data–e.g., using the one-parameter
functional form proposed by Prelec (1998) and his suggested parameter value of α = 0.65,
pi′(µ) > 1.0 for µ < 0.069, pi′(µ) > 1.5 for µ < 0.028, and pi′(µ) > 2.0 for µ < 0.015. As
we discuss in Section 4.3, insofar as our estimated Ω(µ) reflects probability weighting, it is
more in line with the function originally posited by Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
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C.2 Ko˝szegi-Rabin Loss Aversion
Another possible source of probability distortions is loss aversion. The original, "status quo"
loss aversion proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979)–wherein gains and losses are de-
fined relative to initial wealth–cannot explain aversion to risk in the context of insurance
deductible choices because all outcomes are losses relative to initial wealth. More recently,
however, Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007) and Sydnor (2010) have suggested that a form of "ratio-
nal expectations" loss aversion proposed by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006)–wherein gains and
losses are defined relative to expectations about outcomes–can explain the aversion to risk
manifested in insurance deductible choices.
In the Ko˝szegi-Rabin (KR) model, the utility from choosing lottery Y ≡ (yn, qn)
N
n=1 given
a reference lottery Y˜ ≡ (y˜m, q˜m)
M
m=1 is
V (Y |Y˜ ) ≡
N∑
n=1
M∑
m=1
qnq˜m [u(yn) + v(yn|y˜m)] .
The function u represents standard "intrinsic" utility defined over final wealth states, just
as in the expected utility model. The function v represents "gain-loss" utility that results
from experiencing gains or losses relative to the reference point. For v, KR use
v(y|y˜) =
{
η [u(y)− u(y˜)] if u(y) > u(y˜)
ηλ [u(y)− u(y˜)] if u(y) ≤ u(y˜)
.
In this formulation, the magnitude of gain-loss utility is determined by the intrinsic utility
gain or loss relative to consuming the reference point. Moreover, gain-loss utility takes a
two-part linear form, where η ≥ 0 captures the importance of gain-loss utility relative to
intrinsic utility and λ ≥ 1 captures loss aversion. The model reduces to expected utility
when η = 0 or λ = 1.
KR propose that the reference lottery equals recent expectations about outcomes–i.e.,
if a household expects to face lottery Y˜ , then its reference lottery becomes Y˜ . However,
because situations vary in terms of when a household deliberates about its choices and when
it commits to its choices, KR offer a number of solution concepts for the determination of
the reference lottery. For insurance applications, KR suggest a "choice-acclimating personal
equilibrium" (CPE). Formally:
Definition (CPE). Given a choice set Y, a lottery Y ∈ Y is a choice-acclimating personal
equilibrium if for all Y ′ ∈ Y, V (Y |Y ) ≥ V (Y ′|Y ′).
In a CPE, a household’s reference lottery corresponds to its choice. KR argue that CPE is
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appropriate in situations where the household commits to a choice well in advance of the
resolution of uncertainty, and thus it knows that by the time the uncertainty is resolved
and it experiences utility, it will have become accustomed to its choice and hence expect the
lottery induced by its choice. In particular, KR suggest that CPE is the appropriate solution
concept for insurance applications.
Under the KR model with CPE, the utility to the household from choosing deductible
lottery Ld = (−pd, 1− µ;−pd − d, µ) is
U(Ld) = V (Ld|Ld) = (1− µ)u(w − pd) + µu(w − pd − d) (A.5)
−η(λ− 1)(1− µ)µ[u(w − pd)− u(w − pd − d)].
From equation (A.5), it is clear that one can not separately identify the parameters η and λ,
and thus we focus on the product η(λ − 1) ≡ Λ. Substituting Λ into equation (A.5) yields
equation (5) in Section 4.3.
C.3 Gul Disappointment Aversion
Probability distortions also can arise from disappointment aversion. The concept of dis-
appointment aversion was proposed by Bell (1985) and further developed by Loomes and
Sugden (1986) and Gul (1991). The basic idea is that a person is disappointed (or elated)
if the outcome of a lottery is worse (or better) than "expected." The approaches differ in
terms of the nature of the disutility from disappointment, and in terms of the definition of
what is "expected."
Here, we follow the approach of Gul (1991), in which disutility arises when the outcome
of a lottery is less than the certainty equivalent for the lottery. For deductible lotteries, an
intuitive way to express this model is that U(Ld) is the u(z) such that
u(z) = [(1− µ)u(w − pd) + µu(w − pd − d)]− βµ [u(z)− u(w − pd − d)] .
In this formulation, z represents the certainty equivalent. The first bracketed term is the
standard expected utility of Ld. The second term reflects the expected disutility from disap-
pointment that arises when the outcome is less than the certainty equivalent (which occurs in
the event of a claim). The parameter β captures the magnitude of disappointment aversion,
where the model reduces to expected utility for β = 0. We can rearrange this equation to
yield
U(Ld) =
(
1−
µ(1 + β)
1 + βµ
)
u(w − pd) +
(
µ(1 + β)
1 + βµ
)
u(w − pd − d), (A.6)
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which is equivalent to equation (6) in Section 4.3.2
As illustrated in Figure 3 in Section 4.3, Gul disappointment aversion and KR loss aver-
sion with CPE generate qualitatively similar probability distortions for claim probabilities
in the range of our data. This follows from the fact that these models are quite similar to
each other. Both models assume that a household experiences a form of "gain-loss utility"
that depends on how its realized outcome compares to a reference point which is determined
by the household’s choice. The models differ only in the nature of the reference point asso-
ciated with each choice–in Gul disappointment aversion the reference point is the certainty
equivalent of the chosen lottery, whereas in KR loss aversion it is the chosen lottery itself.
Bell (1985) and Loomes and Sugden (1986) differ from Gul (1991) in (effectively) assuming
that the reference point is the standard expected utility of the chosen lottery. Combining
that formulation with a two-part linear disappointment/elation function would yield a model
that is equivalent to KR loss aversion with CPE.
C.4 Combinations of Sources
Finally, we consider combinations of sources. In particular, we focus on combining a proba-
bility weighting function pi(µ) with either KR loss aversion or Gul disappointment aversion.
When we combine probability weighting and KR loss aversion, an issue arises: Given
a reference lottery Y˜ ≡ (y˜m, q˜m)
M
m=1, should the utility comparisons in V (Y |Y˜ ) use the
probabilities q˜m for the comparison weights, or should they use the decision weights pi(q˜m)?
KR offer no guidance on this modeling choice, as they abstract from nonlinear decision
weights. To our minds, it seems natural to assume that households treat the chosen lottery
and the reference lottery symmetrically. Accordingly, we assume that the decision weights
are the same for the chosen lottery and the reference lottery. Under this assumption, we can
rewrite equation (A.5) as
U(Ld) = V (Ld|Ld) = (1− pi(µ))u(w − pd) + pi(µ)u(w − pd − d)
−Λ(1− pi(µ))pi(µ)[u(w − pd)− u(w − pd − d)],
which is equivalent to equation (A.3) with Ω(µ) = pi(µ)[1+Λ(1−pi(µ))]. From this equation,
it is clear that, unless we impose strong functional form assumptions on pi(µ), we cannot
separately identify Λ and pi(µ). Rather, the best we can do is to derive, for various values
of Λ, an implied probability weighting function pi(µ). Panel (c) of Figure 3 in Section 4.3
performs this exercise.
2Note that equation (A.6) is equivalent to the equation at the top of page 677 in Gul (1991).
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Combining probability weighting and Gul disappointment aversion is more straightfor-
ward, as we merely replace µ with pi(µ) in equation (A.6). With this substitution, equation
(A.6) is equivalent to equation (A.3) with Ω(µ) = pi(µ)(1 + β)/(1 + βpi(µ)). From this it is
clear that, unless we impose strong functional form assumptions on pi(µ), we cannot sepa-
rately identify β and pi(µ). Rather, the best we can do is to derive, for various values of β,
an implied probability weighting function pi(µ). The resulting figure would be very similar
to panel (c) of Figure 3 in Section 4.3.
D MCMC Procedure: Hierarchical Bayes for Mixed
Logit
In Models 3 and 4, we allow for unobserved heterogeneity in ri and Ωi(µ). In particular, we
assume
ln ri = βrZi + ξr,i and ln Ωi(µ) = βΩ,1Zi +
(
βΩ,2Zi
)
µ+
(
βΩ,3Zi
)
µ2 + ξΩ,i,
where
(
ξr,i, ξΩ,i
) iid
˜N(0,Φ). The utility from deductible d ∈ D is given by
U(d) ≡ U(Ld) + εd,
where εd follows a type 1 extreme value distribution with scale parameter σ. Assuming
U(Ld) is specified by equation (2) in Section 3.1, we have
U(d) = − [pd + Ω(µ)d]−
r
2
[
(1− Ω(µ)) (pd)
2 + Ω(µ) (pd + d)
2]+ εd,
which can be re-written as
U(d) = −pd − Ω(µ)d−
r
2
(pd)
2 −
r
2
Ω(µ)
[
(pd + d)
2 − (pd)
2]+ εd. (A.7)
Hence, a household i chooses deductible d in coverage j when Uij(d) > Uij(d
′) for all d′ 6= d,
and thus the probability that household i chooses deductible d in coverage j conditional on
the observables and conditional on
(
ξr,i, ξΩ,i
)
is
P(Dij|ξr,i, ξΩ,i) ≡ Pr
(
Dij = d|Pij, µ̂ij, Zi, ξr,i, ξΩ,i
)
(A.8)
= Pr
(
εd′ − εd < U(Ld)− U(Ld′) for all d
′ 6= d|Pij, µ̂ij, Zi, ξr,i, ξΩ,i
)
=
exp (U(Ld)/σ)∑
d′∈D exp (U(Ld′)/σ)
.
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The unconditional probability that household i chooses a triple (dL, dM , dH) is given by
the integral of the product of equation (A.8) across contexts, against the distribution of(
ξr,i, ξΩ,i
)
: ∫ ∏
k=L,M,H
P(Dik = dk|ξr,i, ξΩ,i)φ(ξr,i, ξΩ,i; 0,Φ)dξr,idξΩ,i, (A.9)
where φ(ξr,i, ξΩ,i; 0,Φ) is the bivariate normal density. We observe data {Dij,Γij}, where Dij
is household i’s deductible choice for coverage j and Γij ≡ (Zi, µ̂ij, Pij). In Γij, Zi is a vector
of household characteristics, µ̂ij is household i’s predicted claim probability for coverage j,
and Pij denotes household i’s menu of premium-deductible pairs for coverage j. The set of
fixed parameters (fixed coefficients) to be estimated is θ ≡ (βr, βΩ,1, βΩ,2, βΩ,3, σL, σM , σH).
Additionally, we estimate Φ, the covariance matrix of the heterogeneity terms (random co-
efficients) ~ξ ≡
(
ξr,i, ξΩ,i
)
. For a given claim probability µ, equation (A.7) can be seen as a
linear function in the explanatory variables {pd, d, (pd)
2 , [(pd + d)
2 − (pd)
2]} and their corre-
sponding coefficients, with the coefficient on the last variable constrained to be the product
of the second and third coefficients. The first coefficient being one is a scale normalization,
since the variance of the choice noise is unconstrained. Hence, identification follows from
standard arguments for mixed logit models and our discussion in Section 3.3, provided there
is sufficient variation in p and d.3
Notice that maximum likelihood estimation cannot be directly carried out, because the
integral in equation (A.9) cannot be calculated analytically. Hence, we employ Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, which avoid integration entirely. Intuitively, in MCMC the
integration over unobserved heterogeneity terms is substituted by augmenting the data with
draws of the unobserved heterogeneity terms, and updating the distribution from which the
draws are taken based on likelihood improvement criteria. The result of the MCMC proce-
dure is the joint posterior distribution of (θ,Φ). By the Bernstein-von Mises theorem, the
mean of the posterior is an estimator that, in frequentist terms, is asymptotically equivalent
to the (computationally infeasible) maximum likelihood estimator (Train 2009, ch. 12).
The MCMC procedure that we use is built on the Gibbs sampler and Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm. It requires the choice of priors, which then are combined with the data, and in
particular the observed choices, to obtain the posterior distribution of (θ,Φ). We set:
3Furthermore, when we specify Ω(µ) = a + bµ exp(ξb) in Section 6.1, one can immediately see that the
model continues to be linear in the explanatory variables {pd, d, (pd)
2
, [(pd+d)
2−(pd)
2], µ[(pd+d)
2−(pd)
2]}
and their corresponding coefficients, with some constraints between the coefficients. Hence, for this case
identification also follows from standard arguments for mixed logit models and our discussion in Section 3.3,
provided there is sufficient variation in p and d and µ.
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Priors
1. The fixed coefficients βr, βΩ,1, βΩ,2, and βΩ,3 are assumed to have a normal distribution
with a diffused prior. The fixed coefficients σL, σM , and σH are assumed to have a
lognormal distribution with a diffused prior.
2. The prior on the matrix Φ is inverted Wishart with 2 degrees of freedom and scale
matrix I(2).
Initial Values
1. All unobserved heterogeneity terms (random coefficients) are set to zero.
2. The initial value of θ is set to that estimated under the assumption of no unobserved
heterogeneity.4
3. The initial draw of Φ is 2 · I(2).
The posterior distribution of (θ,Φ) conditional on Γij is obtained via simulations, using
Gibbs sampling and Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, as detailed below.
Simulation: Gibbs Sampling
1. Draws of Φ | ~ξi,∀i : The posterior for Φ is inverted Wishart with 2 + N degrees of
freedom and scale matrix (2 · I(2) + N · S)/(2 + N), where N is the sample size and
S is the sample variance of ~ξ. A draw from inverted Wishart is obtained according to
standard techniques (Train 2009, § 12.5.2).
2. Draws of ~ξi,∀i | θ,Φ : The posterior for each household’s
~ξ, conditional on θ, on its
choices D, and on other observables Γ is
K(~ξ|θ,Φ, D,Γ) ∝ L(D|~ξ, θ,Γ) · φ(~ξ, 0,Φ),
where
L(D|~ξ, θ,Γ) =
∏
k=L,M,H
P(Dik = dk|ξr,i, ξΩ,i)
is the product of the three choice probabilities (across coverages) and φ(~ξ, 0,Φ) is the
bivariate normal density. Draws from this posterior are obtained with one step of the
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm described below.
4For Model 3, the simulation was also run with different starting values for θ, including the one that
mimics the case when the model is estimated with no probability distortions.
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3. Draws of θ | ~ξi,∀i : The posterior for the fixed coefficients θ, conditional on the draws
of the random coefficients, ~ξi,∀i, on choices D, and on other observables Γ is
K(θ|,~ξi,∀i,Φ, D,Γ) ∝
∏
i
L(D|~ξi, θ,Γ).
Draws from this posterior are obtained with one step of the Metropolis Hastings algo-
rithm on the pooled data, as described below.
Metropolis-Hastings Algorithm for Step 2
For each household i, and a given an initial draw ~ξ
0
i :
• Draw a bivariate standard normal vector ~η.
• Create a trial vector ~ξ
1
i =
~ξ
0
i + ρL~η, where ρ is a positive scalar and L is the (lower
triangular) Choleski factor of Φ.
• Draw a standard uniform variable κ.
• Calculate the ratio
F =
L(D|~ξ
1
, θ,Γ) · φ(~ξ
1
, 0,Φ)
L(D|~ξ
0
, θ,Γ) · φ(~ξ
0
, 0,Φ)
.
• If κ ≤ F, accept the new value of ~ξ
1
i . Otherwise, reset
~ξ
1
i =
~ξ
0
i .
• Repeat.
Metropolis-Hastings Algorithm for Step 3
For a given initial draw θ0:
• Draw a standard normal vector ~η of the same dimensionality as θ.
• Create a trial vector θ1 = θ0 + δ~η, where δ is a positive scalar.
• Draw a standard uniform variable κ.
• Calculate the ratio
F =
∏
i
L(D|~ξi, θ
1,Γ)∏
i
L(D|~ξi, θ
0,Γ)
.
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• If κ ≤ F , accept new value of θ1. Otherwise, reset θ1 = θ0.
• Repeat.
The Run and Convergence
When running an MCMC procedure, one has to worry that the chain has run sufficiently
long to achieve convergence. For Model 3 we run the chain 3,100,000 times.5 We drop the
first 100,000 draws as "burn-in" and retain only every 10th draw as "thinning." The first
figure below shows the trace plot for selected objects of interest. The second figure compares
the densities of the same objects for the first half of the chain versus the second half.
5For Model 4, we run the chain 10,100,000 times.
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In order to more formally assess convergence of our chains, we employ a battery of
statistical tests.6 We note that in our simulation, as is commonly the case with Metropolis-
Hastings based simulations, the draws are autocorrelated. To this end, we use the Raftery-
Lewis diagnostics on each chain (i.e., for all parameters) to determine the "burn-in" and
"thinning."7 We then use the second half of the chain, further thinned by a factor of ten,
that conforms with the Raftery-Lewis diagnostics and passes the Geweke’s chi-squared test
under the assumption of iid draws in the chain for each variable.8
Core Sample (4170 Households)
Geweke test (iid) Autocorrelations
Mean NSE χ2 pr Lag 1 Lag 5 Lag 10 Lag 50
Log r -6.74 0.00 0.21 0.83 0.47 0.24 -0.01
Log Ω(µ): constant -2.82 0.00 0.24 0.59 0.23 0.10 -0.01
Log Ω(µ): linear 10.72 0.01 0.52 0.75 0.25 0.06 -0.04
Log Ω(µ): quadratic -28.07 0.03 0.32 0.68 0.24 0.05 -0.03
σL 17.14 0.01 0.65 0.32 0.15 0.05 -0.01
σM 10.16 0.00 0.38 0.21 0.08 0.03 0.02
σH 95.64 0.07 0.44 0.67 0.38 0.19 -0.01
Φr 0.55 0.00 0.77 0.72 0.33 0.17 -0.01
ΦΩ 0.37 0.00 0.11 0.25 0.13 0.06 0.00
Φr,Ω -0.33 0.00 0.49 0.36 0.09 0.05 -0.01
Raftery-Lewis diagnostics for each parameter chain: I-stat = 3.86.
6We use a version of the CODA package adapted for MATLAB by James P. LeSage.
7The Raftery-Lewis diagnostic is a run length control diagnostic based on a criterion of accuracy of
estimation of the quantile q = 0.025. The number of iterations required to estimate the quantile q to within
an accuracy of ± r = 0.01 with probability s = 0.95 is calculated. Separate calculations are performed for
each variable within each chain.
8The Geweke test is based on the idea that if the sample of draws has attained an equilibrium state,
the means of the first 20 percent of the sample of draws versus the last 50 percent of the sample should be
roughly the same.
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E Additional Sensitivity Checks
In this section, we report the results of several additional sensitivity checks.
E.1 CARA Utility
In our analysis, we consider a second-order Taylor expansion of the utility function, and
also CRRA utility. Here we take yet another approach: we assume constant absolute risk
aversion (CARA) utility, u(w) = − exp(−rw). That is, we specify utility as
U(Ld) =
EU(Ld)
u′(w)
= (1− Ω(µ))
− exp (rpd)
r
+ Ω(µ)
− exp (r (pd + d))
r
,
which we note is independent of wealth w. When we estimate Model 2 with CARA utility,
the main message is the same. The estimates for Ω(µ) indicate similar probability distortions,
albeit somewhat less pronounced than the benchmark, while the estimates for r are higher
than the benchmark. See Table A.17.
E.2 Alternative Samples
In the core sample, we restrict attention to households who hold both auto and home poli-
cies and who first purchased their auto and home policies from the company in the same
year, in either 2005 or 2006. Here we estimate Model 2 using two less restrictive samples:
(1) households who hold auto policies and who first purchased their auto policies from the
company in the same year, in either 2005 or 2006; and (2) households who hold both auto
and home policies and who first purchased their auto and home policies from the company in
the same year, in either 2004, 2005, or 2006. Again, the main message is the same. In both
samples, the estimates for Ω(µ) indicate probability distortions that are very similar to the
benchmark. As for standard risk aversion, in sample 1 the estimates for r are higher than
the benchmark estimates, while in sample 2 they are lower than the benchmark estimates.
See Tables A.18 and A.19.
E.3 Restricted Menus
In our main analysis, we use the full menu of deductible options for each coverage, up
to $1000. In each coverage, however, the vast majority of households choose one of three
deductibles: 92.3 percent of households choose a deductible of $200, $250, or $500 in auto
collision; 87.1 percent of households choose a deductible of $200, $250, or $500 in auto
comprehensive; and 97.5 percent of households choose a deductible of $250, $500, or $1000
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in home. Given these choice patterns, one might worry that households do not really consider
the other deductible options, which could bias our estimates.9 To address this concern, we
estimate Model 2 when we restrict the menu of deductible options to {$200, $250, $500} for
each auto coverage and to {$250, $500, $1000} for home coverage.10 The estimates for Ω(µ)
indicate probability distortions that are similar to the benchmark. Indeed, the overweighting
is more pronounced at high claim probabilities. The estimates for r are lower than the
benchmark estimates. See Table A.20.
E.4 Alternative Error Structures
In our main analysis, we assume that the utility from every deductible d ∈ D is given by
U(d) = U(Ld) + εd, where εd is an iid Gumbel random variable. Here, we estimate Model
2 under two alternative assumptions (and, for computational and theoretical reasons, using
the restricted menus from Section E.3 above): (A) we assume (as before) that the utility
from every deductible d ∈ D is given by U(d) = U(Ld) + εd, but we assume that εd is an iid
normal random variable; and (B) we assume that the utility from the maximum deductible,
D, is given by U(D) = U(LD) + εD, where εD is an iid normal random variable, but that
the utility from the other deductibles are given by U(d) = U(Ld) + ζd, where ζd = −εD for
the minimum deductible and ζd = 0 for the intermediate deductible. Alternative A provides
a check of the Gumbel error assumption. Alternative B adds a check of the iid assumption.
More specifically, we consider alternative B to address concerns arising from the fact that
in principle the iid assumption allows for nonmonotonic ranking of deductibles. Once again,
the main message is the same. Under both alternatives, the estimates for Ω(µ) indicate
similar probability distortions, though generally somewhat more pronounced. In addition,
under alternative A the estimates for r are lower than the benchmark estimates, while under
alternative B they are higher than the benchmark estimates. See Tables A.21 and A.22.
F Appendix Tables and Figures
On the ensuing pages, we report Tables A.1 through A.22 and Figures A.1 through A.4.
9For instance, when a household chooses a $250 deductible in home, we are using the fact that it did
not choose a $100 deductible to infer an upper bound on its aversion to risk. But if the household in fact
does not even consider the $100 deductible as an option, our inference would be invalid. Similarly, when a
household chooses a $500 deductible in auto comprehensive, we are using the fact that it did not choose a
$1000 deductible to infer a lower bound on its aversion to risk. Again, if the household in fact does not even
consider the $1000 deductible as an option, our inference would be invalid.
10In each case, if a household’s actual deductible choice is outside the restricted menu, we assign to the
household the deductible option from the restricted menu that is closest to their actual deductible choice.
In this respect, we follow Cohen and Einav (2007).
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Figure A.1: Mean Estimated Ω(µ) — Unobserved Heterogeneity in Risk
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Figure A.2: Mean Estimated Ω(µ) — Restricted Choice Noise
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Figure A.3: Mean Estimated Ω(µ) — CRRA Utility
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Figure A.4: Estimated Ω(µ) — All Claims $750
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